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ABSTRACT
The dissertation is composed of two essays. In the first essay, authors
conceptualize recall environment, test its effect on post-recall stock returns and identify
the role of recall and product characteristics in moderating this relationship. The authors
test their hypotheses on a sample of 90 recall announcements in the automobile industry
from 2011 to 2016. The results show that on average, announcing a recall in an intense
environment aggravates negative stock returns accruing from the recall. Further, while
low reputation brands are mostly prone to this negative impact of recall environment,
high reputation brands are less susceptible to this negative impact. The negative stock
returns from recalls could even be eliminated for new products of high reputation brands.
The study has implications for firm managers and public policy in terms of the timing
and choice of brands and products for a recall announcement.
Moreover, firms are becoming more engaged in corporate social responsibility
(CSR) efforts with a questionable impact on firm performance. Specifically, how
different CSR activities may help or hurt performance outcomes in case of a negative
firm event is not apparent. The second essay examines how a firm’s CSR record in
philanthropy and sustainability domains may alter the negative outcomes of a product
recall announcement. Using a sample of 265 monthly recall observations from the
automobile industry from 2011 to 2014, authors find that while philanthropy efforts may
help firms attenuate part of the market penalties accruing from a product recall,
sustainability efforts have an inverted U-shape association with market penalties.
vi

Our findings show that low levels of sustainability efforts will intensify but high
levels will decrease a recall’s damage to the market performance. It is also found that the
effect of both philanthropy and sustainability efforts decreases when the recall involves
lower reputation brands and younger products. The study has implications for managers
in terms of adjusting pre-recall CSR efforts in different domains to manage financial
damage of a product recall.
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CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF RECALL ENVIRONMENT
INTENSITY ON POST-RECALL FIRM PERFORMANCE:
INSIGHTS FROM THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY1

The frequency and impact of product recalls have increased substantially over the past
two decades. According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) data, recalls of
medical devices have increased by more than 500% from 2003 to 2017, from 604 to
3202. In 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported
1036 recalls affecting 29.3% of vehicles on the road, a 270% increase compared to 1997
(NHTSA 2018; Statista 2017). Product recalls impact firm performance by imposing
direct and indirect costs (Barber and Darrough 1996). Notable examples in the
automobile industry are recalls associated with GM’s ignition crisis, with $4.1 billion in
repair costs and victim compensation (CNN Money 2015), and Toyota’s acceleration
crisis, which led to about $3.1 billion in recall costs, lost in sales and settlements (Wall
Street Journal 2012).
Product recalls have been shown to negatively impact firm value (e.g., Barber and
Darrough 1996; Chen and Nguyen 2013; Chu, Lin, and Prather 2005; Davidson and
Worrell 1992; Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1987; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Thirumalai and
Sinha 2011; Thomsen and McKenzie 2001). However, the negative impact of product
recalls on stock returns could vary depending on the timing of the recall, recall strategy
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(passive vs. proactive), the degree of harm, defective component, type of remedy, and ad
spending before the recall (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Davidson and Worrel 1992;
Eilert et al. 2017; Gao, Xie, Wang, and Wilbur 2015; Rupp 2004).
Even though existing research has implied the existence of recall environment
(Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985), its ramifications for firm
outcomes has been completely ignored. Accordingly, we add to the existing research on
product recalls by explicitly conceptualizing recall environment intensity, studying its
impact on abnormal stock returns, and how this relationship could be modified by recall
and product characteristics. We theorize recall environment intensity as the salience of
competitor recalls as reflected by their size, publicity, scope, and recency. We capture
recall environment intensity using entropy measures for market concentration. We then
conceptualize the relationship between recall environment intensity and firm
performance, and how this relationship could be moderated by characteristics of the
brands and products that are being recalled.
Announcement of a recall in a recall environment of high intensity could be a
“double-edged” sword. It can either reduce the damage to the firm performance by
decreasing customers’ blaming the firm for the recall or intensify the damage by
attracting investors’ attention towards the recall. Using data from the automobile
industry, we find the latter mechanism to be dominant. Hence, on average, recall
environment intensity has a negative effect on the impact of a recall on stock returns – it
increases losses. However, the direction and strength of this effect depend on recall and
product characteristics. We find that as recall environment intensity increases, recalls of
brands with a lower reputation for reliability see a sharper drop in stock prices, and this
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effect is stronger when the recalled products are old (vs. new). However, when higher
reputation brands with new (vs. old) products are recalled, the negative effect of a recall
on firm performance may be partly attenuated through a high intensity environment.
We contribute to several areas of the product recall literature, as Table 1.1
summarizes. First, we conceptualize recall environment intensity and develop a measure
for the construct. As discussed before, prior research has found a negative impact of
product recalls on stock returns (e.g., Barber and Darrough 1996; Chu, Lin, and Prather
2005; Davidson and Worrell 1992; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Thirumalai and Sinha
2011). It has also, to a limited extent, examined the impact of recall environment without
formally conceptualizing and measuring the construct (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988).
We suggest that given the frequency of recalls, the salience of the environment in which
the focal recall happens needs to be explicitly modeled to explain its impact on stock
returns. We account for the recall environment as a critical overlooked variable to have a
more accurate measure of the impact of recalls on firm value.
Next, our study contributes to the literature on recall timing. Hora, Bapuji, and
Roth (2011) introduce recall strategy, product defect type, and supply chain position of
the firm issuing the recall as variables that explain recall delay. Eilert et al. (2017) show
delaying recalls when a product is under investigation worsens negative abnormal returns
when the recall is announced. Our research identifies another recall timing decision, i.e.
issuing a recall closer to or farther from competitors’ recalls. This timing decision seems
more tactical since it varies by days or weeks, in contrast to more strategic timing
decisions that vary by months or years as in Eilert et al. (2017).
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Finally, our article contributes to the literature on the impact of product recalls on
consumers and marketing metrics, since our performance variable, stock market returns,
offers a good measure of consumer responses to product recalls (Germann, Grewal, Ross,
and Srivastava 2014). Prior research has shown that a severe recall hurts a firm’s image
(Souiden and Pons 2009), as well as its baseline sales, advertising effectiveness, and
customers’ price sensitivity (Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). Researchers have
also identified factors such as loyalty, commitment, and expectations that moderate the
impact of a recall on consumers (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000; Cleeren,
Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Especially, it has been shown that
a major driver of consumers’ negative reactions to a recall is whether they attribute the
blame to the firm or to external factors (Klein and Dawar 2004; Lei, Dawar, and GurhanCanli 2012; Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). In the current paper, we argue that
customers may have less negative reactions to a product recall when due to the high
environment intensity, they attribute the product failure to external, rather than firmrelated, factors. However, we propose that the strength of this effect depends on the
recalled brand’s reliability reputation and the recalled product’s age.
We organize the article as follows. First, we present our conceptual framework
and develop hypotheses. Next, we introduce our data and the methodology used to
analyze it (an event study to determine the dependent variable, a matching procedure to
address the endogeneity of the main independent variable, and a cross-sectional
regression model to find the effects). Finally, we present the results, conclude the article
with theoretical and managerial implications, and suggest several directions for future
research.
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1.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
In this section we explain the importance of the recall environment in shaping
stakeholders’ reaction, then we conceptualize the recall environment, and explain how it
could influence stakeholders’ response. We end this section by providing theoretical
arguments for potential moderators to establish boundary conditions.
1.2.1 Conceptualizing Recall Environment
Recall environment is an implicit part of any recall announcement, yet it has not been
explicitly conceptualized in prior research. Accordingly, we conceptualize recall
environment intensity as the salience of competitors’ recalls at the time of the focal firm’s
recall. The salience of competitor recalls could not only affect retrieval and use of
information to judge focal recall (Feldman and Lynch 1988) but also generates awareness
about focal firm’s recalls (Borah and Tellis 2016). Building on our salience argument, we
suggest that focal recalls are likely to be judged in the light of the size, publicity, and
scope, of competitors’ recalls. Large and highly publicized competitor recalls that affect
multiple product segments could be used as a yardstick by the stakeholders to evaluate
the focal recall (Borah and Tellis 2016) by enhancing awareness, and accessibility of
product-related information (Berger, Sorensen, Rasmussen 2010). Further, we argue that
the salience of competitors’ recalls could also be determined by their recency. Due to
decay in memory over time, competitors’ recalls in the distant past are less likely to be
used by the stakeholders to evaluate the current recalls (Feldman and Lynch 1988).
Furthermore, any buzz created by competitor recalls is likely to decline over time (Borah
and Tellis 2016).
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To summarize, we propose that characteristics of competitors’ recalls, such as: (1)
size (i.e., the number of vehicles affected by a competitor’s recall), (2) scope (i.e., the
number of vehicle segments involved in a competitor’s recall), (3) publicity (i.e. the
number of media citations of a competitor’s recall), and (4) recency (the time distance
between a competitor’s recall and the focal firm’s recall), determine the salience of
competitors’ recalls, and therefore constitute the recall environment. To illustrate,
competitors’ recalls that are larger in size, involve several vehicle segments, are highly
cited by media, and closer to the focal firm’s recall create a more intense recall
environment than competitor recalls that are smaller in size, involve one or few vehicle
segments, are less publicized, and farther in time from the focal firm’s recall. The recall
environment varies in intensity as the set of competitor recalls and their characteristics
vary with time.
1.2.2 Recall Environment and Stock Returns
It is important to understand and conceptualize recall environment intensity because of its
potential impact on stock market responses to product recalls. First, recall environment
may moderate the impact of a product recall on the level and volatility of future cash
flows. It is well established in the literature that the stock market reacts to a negative firm
event depending on its impact on the level and volatility of future cash flows (Tetlock
2007). Accordingly, stock market reaction to a product recall is to some extent based on
the recall’s direct costs of repairs, transactions, and compensations. Beyond this, a
significant portion of share price decline is due to a loss in sales and goodwill of the firm
(Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). Hence, a negative event such as a product recall, by
affecting customers’ attitude towards the firm and its products, could determine stock
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market reactions (Xiong and Bhardwaj 2013; Gao et al. 2015; Germann et al. 2014).
When a product defect occurs, customers engage in spontaneous attributions to find the
locus of blame for product failure (Wong and Weiner 1981). This attribution can be
dispositional, when customers perceive a firm as primarily responsible for the failure, or
situational when customers attribute the failure to external factors. By default, the
attributions would be dispositional where customers blame the firm for its product failure
(Cowley 2005). However, customers may revise their default attribution if they are
provided with information regarding some situational constraints facing the firm (Gilbert,
Pelham, and Krull 1988).
Kelley's (1972) discounting principle suggests that in the presence of competing
explanations consumers are likely to discount the cause of a negative event. A wellknown example is the Ford-Firestone tire controversy in 1999 where each firm tried to
pin the failure to another one. However, according to a survey by Folkes and Patrick
(2001), the respondents blamed Firestone more than Ford and wanted to penalize
Firestone more than Ford.
One type of information that can help customers adjust their attribution of blame
and discount the role of the firm in product failure is the salience of recalls in an industry
(Folkes 1988). In this spirit, we propose that in an intense recall environment, the market
may penalize the firm less for the recall. On the other hand, when the recall environment
intensity is low, the likelihood of consumers perceiving external factors as causing the
recall is low, and they are not motivated to adjust their default decision in blaming the
firm as the main cause of the recall. We label this as the attribution adjustment effect.
Due to the attribution adjustment effect, a recall in an intense environment is less likely to
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endanger future cash flows of the firm and hence, the negative impact of recalls on stock
return will be lower.
In contrast to the attribution adjustment effect, it is also possible that the recall
environment could prompt shareholders to pay more attention to the focal recall. Unlike
the efficient market hypothesis, which suggests that investors react to new information
only by virtue of its content and not contextual features such as timing and source, the
rational expectations with incomplete information model suggests that investors’
attention to the firm at the time of an event could be a major determinant of stock price
reactions (Warren and Sorescu 2017; Xiong & Bhardwaj 2013). High recall environment
intensity may increase the visibility of a focal firm’s recall as negative chatter about
competitors could direct attention towards the focal firm’s products (Borah and Tellis
2016). Therefore, the focal firm’s recall may be rendered more salient in an active recall
environment. Thus, to the extent stock market reactions to an event rely on investors’
attention towards the event (Barber and Odean 2008), a recall announcement in an
intense environment may lead to a steeper decline in stock prices. We label this as the
attention-grabbing effect.
To summarize, we propose two competing mechanisms through which recall
environment could shape stakeholders’ reaction: (1) attribution adjustment effect and (2)
attention-grabbing effect. The overall impact of recall environment intensity on postrecall stock returns could depend on the relative strengths of attribution adjustment and
attention-grabbing effects. Thus, we propose two competing hypotheses:
H1A: Higher recall environment intensity diminishes negative stock market
reactions to a recall.
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H1B: Higher recall environment intensity increases negative stock market
reactions to a recall.
1.2.3 Boundary Conditions
Given the two competing effects, boundary conditions that highlight one or other of these
effects become important. Accordingly, we propose recalled products’ age and recalled
brands’ reliability reputation as the two moderators that could let either the attribution
adjustment effect or the attention-grabbing effect to dominate. We selected these two
potential moderators because 1) they determine whether customers have any reason to
adjust their default attribution of blame, and 2) how much the focal firm’s recall is
attended by investors on its own and hence, the marginal increase in attention caused by
recall environment intensity. Hence, the net effect of the recall environment intensity on
stock market reactions could be found based on these two variables.
1.2.3.1 Recalled Products’ Age
We propose that age of the product, defined as the time difference between the product’s
introduction and its recall, could moderate the impact of recall environment intensity on
post-recall stock returns by changing the strength of attribution adjustment and attentiongrabbing effects. When a newly introduced product is recalled, there is a fair degree of
uncertainty about the reasons and severity of product failure, since the product is not fully
tested by experts and customers (Gao et al. 2015). As such, in the absence of an evident
cause for the recall, customers will be more receptive to recall environment intensity
information, and less motivated to place all the blame of the recall on the firm. Thus,
attribution adjustment is likely to happen when the recalled product is new.
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However, when a product has been on the market for a while, plenty of expert
analysis and customer feedback about the product are publicly available. Hence,
compared to a newly introduced product, customers have more access to information for
reasoning about the failure of an older product. In this case, customers may be less
motivated to look for contextual information to find out who should be blamed for the
product failure, and hence may be less prone to revising their blame attribution based on
environment intensity information. Further, it is more likely that managers of a firm
could know about defects of an old product months before an investigation is opened or a
recall is issued (Gao et al. 2015; Hora Bapuji, and Roth 2011). Hence, stakeholders may
expect the firm to be aware of problems with the product, and therefore less likely to look
for other information in assigning blame for the recall. Thus, for the older products, the
attribution adjustment effect is likely to be weaker.
Prior research has also shown that recalls of older vehicles lead to lower owner
response rates than those of newer vehicle (Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly 1994). Likewise, the
recall perception among the used car owners indicates that consumers are likely to be
indifferent to recalls of older models (NADA 2014). Further, a recent survey by Sivak
and Schoettle (2017) show that while 82% of people are likely to get a new vehicle
repaired for a defect, only 50% of people are likely to get older vehicles repaired. Thus,
in general investors and consumers are more concerned about newer vehicles, and recalls
of newer vehicles by default receives high attention from the stock market. Thus the
marginal increase in the attention caused by a high-intensity environment for older
products could be mitigated. Accordingly, the attention-grabbing effect is likely to be
stronger for older products.
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In sum, we propose that as the age of recalled vehicle increases, the attribution
adjustment effect will be weakened while the attention-grabbing effect will be
strengthened. Hence, for older products, the main effect of environment intensity is more
likely to be negative and we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: Product age negatively moderates the impact of recall environment intensity
on stock market reactions.

1.2.3.2 Reliability Reputation
A brand’s reliability reputation is stakeholders’ subjective belief about a brand’s quality
and dependability (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Prior research has investigated the
impact of reliability reputation on different aspects of product recalls such as market
penalties (Rhee and Haunschild 2006), timing decisions (Eilert et al. 2017) and learning
outcomes (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). We posit that reliability reputation
could also moderate the impact of recall environment intensity on post-recall stock
returns by changing the strength of attribution adjustment and attention-grabbing effects.
First, the reliability reputation of a brand influences stakeholders’ sensitivity to
product failure (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Customers have positive beliefs about the
quality of products by a high-reputation brand and a product failure contradicts those
beliefs. As a result, customers could engage in an active search for information to refute
the negative information about the product recall (Edwards and Smith 1996). For lowreputation brands, a product recall confirms negative beliefs of low reliability, and thus,
reinforces default attribution of blame to the firm. In this case, customers are less
receptive to recall environment intensity information to adjust their default attributions.
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Hence, the attribution adjustment effect is likely to be stronger when the brand has a
higher reliability reputation than when the brand has a lower reliability reputation.
Second, products of high-reputation brands are better known, and their failure
violates expectations of high quality. Events that violate expectations are more salient
and receive more attention (Rhee and Valdez 2009). Thus, product recalls by highreputation brands are likely to receive more baseline attention from the mass media and
investors (Deephouse 2000; Hoffman and Ocasio 2001). Accordingly, the attentiongrabbing effect due to recall environment intensity is likely to be weaker for highreputation brands than that for the low-reputation brands because of their higher baseline
level of attention.
Due to the strengthening of attribution adjustment effect and the weakening of
attention-grabbing effect, for higher reputation brands, the impact of recall environment
intensity on stock market reactions is more likely to be positive and we suggest the
following hypothesis:
H3: Reliability reputation positively moderates the impact of recall environment
intensity on stock market reactions.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
Since we are interested in the effect of recall environment intensity on post-recall firm
performance, we use short-term abnormal returns (ARs), accruing from the recall
announcement to the focal firm, as a measure of firm performance (e.g., Hendricks and
Singhal 1996). Thus, we start with the event study framework to first calculate abnormal
returns, and then we use an econometric model to examine the impact of recall
environment intensity on abnormal returns.
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1.3.1 Data
To test our conceptual framework, we collected product recall data pertaining to the
automotive industry from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
database. Automotive industry is both economically and empirically conducive for our
research, as: (1) it is the largest manufacturing sector, responsible for 3% of America’s
GDP, and the leading source of job multiplier in the United States (American Automotive
Policy Council 2018), (2) prior research has also used the automotive industry as a
context to test different theories (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016; Haunschild and Rhee 2004;
Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Gao et al. 2015; Eilert et al. 2017), and (3) NHTSA regularly
collects vehicle safety recalls information, which could be accessed for research.
Specifically, we obtained data on the six largest automakers (Toyota, Honda, Nissan,
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) from January 2011 to December 2016, as these six
automakers account for about 80% of the U.S. motor vehicle market and have the highest
number of recalls. Like prior research, we included a vehicle safety recall in the sample
only if it was large in proportion to the size of the firm that announced the recall (Gao et
al. 2015). To illustrate, we considered recalls involving 50,000 or more vehicles in case
of Toyota; 40,000 or more vehicles in case of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler;
30,000 or more vehicles in case of Honda; or 20,000 or more vehicles in case of Nissan.
Based on this criterion, our starting sample consists of 296 vehicle recalls. Following Gao
et al. (2015), we identified the recall announcement date as the earliest date that the recall
was reported on any online or printed media in the U.S. We dropped 13 recalls for which
no exact announcement date could be identified, as they were never reported by the
media. This reduced our sample to 283 recall announcements. We used this sample to
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identify competitor recalls prior to each recall announcement event to gauge recall
environment intensity at the time of the recall announcement.
To construct a sample suitable for event study, we dropped 48 recalls issued by
firms not listed on the US stock market during the time of the study (Chrysler before
December 2014 and Nissan). Next, to create event windows free of other recalls, we
followed Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1988) and dropped 123 recalls whose [-2, 2] event
windows overlapped with another recall (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Chen, Liu,
and Zhang 2012; Gao et al. 2015). Finally, we dropped 22 observations whose event
windows included other firm announcements such as earnings surprises, new plants, new
product introductions, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, production halts, layoffs,
and changes in top management (Chen, Gansen, and Liu 2009; Gao et al. 2015).
Thus, our final sample consists of 90 automobile safety recalls, and our sample
size is comparable to those in previous studies. For example, Gao et al. (2015) had a
sample of 110 recalls, while Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) had a sample of 116 recalls.
Likewise, Eilert et al. (2017) had a sample of 73 recalls, Germann et al. (2014) had a
sample of 55 recalls, and Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1988) had a sample of 66 recalls.
1.3.2 Measures
Recall environment intensity. To capture recall environment intensity for the focal recall,
we consider competitor recalls announced between the focal firm’s current recall and its
immediate last recall. For example, to capture recall environment intensity for Toyota’s
recall on May 15, 2016, we first obtain the date of immediate last recall by Toyota, which
turns out to be May 5, 2016. Then, we consider competitor recalls between May 5, 2016,
and May 15, 2016, to arrive at a measure of recall environment intensity. We call the
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period between two consecutive recalls by the focal firm (i.e., May 5, 2016 – May 15,
2016) the estimation period. We did not consider competitor recalls before the immediate
last recall to construct the recall environment intensity measure as their information
content has already been accounted for by stakeholders. For instance, the information of
any competitor’s recall before May 5, 2016, would be fully absorbed in Toyota’s stock
price adjustment on that date, such that this information can no longer be considered as
new information by the investors.
As argued in the conceptual framework, recall environment intensity consists of
size, scope, publicity and recency of competitors’ recalls. We adopt a cumulative
measure of concentration index in the competition literature to combine the four
dimensions of recall environment into a single metric. An advantage of such a measure is
that it can be used to account for its sensitivity to changes in different dimensions (Bikker
and Haaf 2002). For our purpose, we weight the information content of competitors’
recall, i.e. size, scope, and publicity, by its time distance from the focal firm’s recall,
which we cumulate over competitors’ recalls. To illustrate, for each day 𝑖 in the
estimation period, we find the number of vehicles recalled by competitors (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 ), the
number of U.S. newspapers citations of competitors’ recalls on that day (𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 ),
and the number of vehicle segments involved in the competitors’ recall (𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖 )
on that day2. The weighted sum of each of these three variables across all days in the
estimation period is used as the aggregate measure of that variable. We use recency i.e.,
the time difference (in days) between competitor’s recall and the focal firm’s recall as the
weighting factor, to account for the fact that recent competitor recalls could have more
2

We used Euro Market Segments which is based on comparison across well-known brand models. See
Appendix A.
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contribution to the recall environment intensity than that of the distant competitor recalls.
Thus, for each focal recall 𝑗 we have:
t

Size

i
2
Sizej = ∑i=t
1 Time

(1.1)

ij

t

2
Publicityj = ∑i=t
1

t

2
Segment j = ∑i=t
1

Publicityi

(1.2)

Timeij
Segmenti

(1.3)

Timeij

where 𝑖 stands for each day in the estimation period, 𝑡2 is the announcement day of the
focal recall, 𝑡1 is the announcement day of the last recall by the same firm, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is the
number of vehicles recalled by competitors on day 𝑖, 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is the number of
newspaper citations of a competitors’ recall on day 𝑖, 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is the number of vehicle
segments involved in a competitors’ recall on day 𝑖, and 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the time difference
between day 𝑖 and the announcement day.
We compute recall environment intensity as the principal component score of the
above three indices. A factor analysis confirms that a single factor accounts for 76.9% of
the three scores’ combined variance. The composite variable is standardized to have a
mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. However, for empirical analyses we code recall
environment intensity (ENV) as a dummy, which takes 0 for negative values of the
composite variable, indicating low environment intensity, and takes 1 for positive values
of the composite variable, indicating high environment intensity.
Product and brand characteristics. We operationalized recalled product’s age
(AGE) as the difference between the recall year and the year the vehicle entered the
market, averaged across all model-years involved in a recall campaign. For example, the
age of a 2012 Toyota Corolla recalled in 2015 would be 3 years. We measure a brand’s
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reliability reputation (REPUT) using a five-point scale of “trouble indexes” reported in
Consumer Reports (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Specifically, we calculate the mean of
the “overall problem rate” scores of each model for the most recent three years of
ownership. We then create an overall problem rate score for a brand in a year by
averaging the overall problem rate scores of all car models of the brand in that year.
Since reputation is built up over the years before the recall happens, an average score
over the five years prior to the selected year is used (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Since
we measure abnormal returns to a recall campaign by a firm (e.g. General Motors) and a
recall campaign may include different brands of that firm (e.g. Chevrolet, Buick,
Cadillac, etc.), we use the average reputation of brands recalled by a firm as the measure
of brand reputation.
1.3.3 Control Variables
Based on prior literature, we identify potential determinants of firm value as 1) direct cost
of a product recall (e.g. Jarrel and Peltzman 1985), 2) consumer market penalties (e.g.
Germann et al. 2014), 3) firm’s capability to respond to a recall (Eilert et al. 2017), and 4)
firm’s ability to protect against the volatility of future cash flows (e.g. Chen, Gansen, and
Liu 2009).
First, we control for factors which determine direct costs associated with product
recalls. We identify these factors as recall size (RECSIZE) and problem severity
(PROBSEV). Higher the recall size, higher would be the costs of repairing the affected
vehicles, and higher could be the negative stock market reactions (Jarrel and Peltzman
1985). Problem severity, defined as the seriousness of the consequences of the product
defect, affects the cost of repairing vehicles and how much vehicle owners are motivated
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to take defective vehicles to dealers (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994; Rupp 2004). We
measure the focal firm’s recall size (RECSIZE) using the logarithm of the number of
vehicles affected (Gao et al. 2015). Problem severity (PROBSEV) is measured using
reports of incidents, i.e. crash, fire, injury or fatality (Eilert et al. 2017). We control for
these reports of incidents using a dummy variable which equals 1 if crashes, fires,
injuries, and fatalities are reported in the recall announcement, and 0 otherwise.
Second, we control for factors such as recall strategy and negative publicity which
could determine consumer market penalties accruing from a recall. A Firm’s recall
strategy (RECSTRA) is defined according to its responsiveness to a recall incident
(Siomkos and Kurzbard's 1994). Proactive recall strategy manifests when firms identify
the defects and its sources in the house, and then issue a voluntary recall. On the other
hand, passive recall strategy involves consumers reporting serious incidents, which will
prompt the government to investigate and subsequently force firms to recall (Chen,
Gansen, and Liu 2009). A passive strategy could damage firm reputation by signaling
firms’ low-quality to its stakeholders, which in turn could lead to a higher market penalty
in terms of equity losses). In contrast, proactive recall strategy signals the firm’s social
responsibility and trustworthiness to its stakeholders, which in turn could lead to lower
market penalty (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Rupp 2001). Following Chen, Gansen, and Liu
(2009), we measure recall strategy using a dummy variable which equals 1 if an NHTSA
investigation is opened before issuing the recall (i.e., passive recall), and 0 otherwise (i.e.,
proactive recall). We control for the negative publicity (i.e., the extent to which the recall
receives attention from the media) of the focal firm’s recall (PUBLICITY) as negative
publicity makes the recall more visible, and therefore determine market penalties
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accruing from the recall (Rhee and Haunschild 2006; Rhee & Valdez 2009). Following
Borah and Tellis (2016), we measure negative publicity as the count number of the recall
announcement citations in the U.S. newspapers.
Third, we control for factors which could affect a firm’s capability to respond to
product failure. Firms responding to product recalls by running product investigations in
a timely manner are likely to receive a less negative reaction from stakeholders (Eilert et
al. 2017). We capture firms’ capability to respond to product recalls using: (a) brand
diversification (DIVERSE), and (b) past recall intensity (PASTREC). Brand
diversification refers to the number and variety of products marketed under a brand
(Dobrev 2000). For more diversified brands it could be costlier to respond product recalls
because due to shared components multiple models need to be investigated to identify the
defect and its source (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). Furthermore, due to a
spillover of negative perceptions of an affected product over to non-affected products,
more diversified brands are pressurized to investigate products that may not necessarily
be at risk (Erdem and Sun 2002). Thus, for diversified brands, indirect costs of product
recalls are likely to be higher, which in turn could lead to more negative stock returns.
We operationalize brand diversification (DIVERSE) in terms of the number of product
lines and range of engine capacities (highest capacity minus the lowest capacity) of the
models produced by a brand in a year (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). We find a high
correlation =.65 between these two components, and thus, combine them into a single
index using principal components analysis. The two scores load on a single factor,
accounting for 85.6 % of the combined variance. Higher scores on this factor reflect
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greater brand diversification. When a firm recalls different brands together, we use the
average diversification of recalled brands.
Past recall intensity (PASTREC), i.e. the extent of product recalls experienced by
the firm in the recent past, on one hand, could enable firms to learn about failures, and
therefore develop managerial competence to deal with them (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha,
and Eilert 2013). While on the other hand, the costly and time-consuming procedure of
issuing recalls in the near past may hinder a firm’s resources to efficiently administer a
recall (Eilert et al. 2017). In either case, post-recall stock returns may be influenced by a
firm’s past recall intensity. We measure past recall intensity using the principal
component of (1) the total number of vehicles recalled, and (2) the total number of recalls
issued by the focal firm in the preceding year (Gao et al. 2015; Eilert et al. 2017).
Finally, following prior literature, we control for firm characteristics that may
help or hinder a healthy cash flow after a recall announcement. These factors include firm
size, firm debt and firm profitability (Gao et al. 2015; Eilert et al. 2017; Chen, Gansen
and Liu 2009). We measure firm size (FRIMSIZE) using the logarithm of the firm’s
quarterly sales, Firm debt (FIRMDEBT) using the logarithm of a firm’s quarterly longterm liability (Gao et al. 2015), and firm profitability (ROA) through dividing a firm’s net
income by its total assets in each quarter (Eilert et al. 2017).
Besides, we also include a year variable (YEAR) measuring years elapsed from
2011 to capture any time trend effects related to changes in firm value (Rhee and
Haunschild 2006). Table 1.2 lists the specific measures and data sources we used to
operationalize variables.
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1.3.4 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is firm value, which we measure as the short-term abnormal
returns to focal firms’ recall announcements. Short-term abnormal returns have been
widely used in the marketing literature to investigate the impact of firm announcements;
such as channel expansions (Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014), mergers and
acquisitions (Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 2008), and marketing alliances
(Swaminathan and Moorman 2009); on stock prices. Product recall announcements could
reveal new information to the stock market and therefore could influence stakeholders’
assessments of firms’ future cash flows. We calculate abnormal return accruing to a recall
announcement as the difference between the observed returns, i.e., R it , and the expected
return, i.e., E(R it ). We estimate expected returns using the Fama-French four-factor
model (Carhart 1997; Fama and French 1993):
E(R it ) = α̂i + β̂i R mt + γ̂i SMBt + δ̂i HMLt + σ̂i UMDt

(1.4)

where R mt is the stock returns of the benchmark market portfolio, SMBt is the
difference between the rate of returns of small and big stock firms, HMLt is the difference
in returns between high and low book-to-market ratio stocks and UMDt is the momentum
factor defined as the difference in returns between firms with high and low past stock
performance. Following prior studies (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Gao et al.
2015), we chose an estimation period of 250 prior trading days (i.e., day -271 to day -22).
We calculate the abnormal returns as the difference between the observed returns and the
expected returns, as:
AR it = R it − E(R it )

(1.5)
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When information leakage (for t1 days before the event) and/or dissemination
over time (for t 2 days after the event) occur, the abnormal returns are aggregated for a
firm over an event window [−t1 , t 2 ] and thus cumulative abnormal returns are calculated,
as:
t

2
CAR (−t1 ,t2 ) = ∑t=−t
AR i(t)
1

(1.6)

We regress this cumulative abnormal returns variable over our independent and control
variables to test hypotheses.
1.3.5 Endogeneity of Recall Environment Intensity
In this section, we discuss the potentially endogenous nature of recall environment
intensity and the strategy we use to overcome endogeneity concerns. Based on our
conceptualization, recall environment intensity is a function of the time at which recall is
announced. However, recall announcement timing could be determined by recall and firm
factors, which could also determine firm value. Hence, in OLS the estimated impact of
recall environment intensity on abnormal returns could be biased. For example, a
manager may be inclined to announce a recall simultaneously with other corporate news,
to benefit from investors’ limited attention and influence firm value. This timing decision
may lead to a recall being announced in a high- or low-intensity environment. To
mitigate the endogeneity concern associated with recall environment, we frame the recall
environment as high intensity and low intensity. Then, we turn to prior literature to
identify factors that could affect both the timing of a recall announcement and firm value.
Subsequently, we use these factors to match firms in the low recall intensity environment
to firms in the high recall intensity environment, using Coarsened Exact Matching or
CEM (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012). The key identifying assumption we make is that
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conditional on the factors which determine the time of recall announcement and firm
value, firms are equally likely to face low-intensity or high-intensity recall environment.
CEM first discretizes/stratifies matching covariates, if they are not already stratified by
the researcher. Then CEM identifies strata which contain firms facing both high-intensity
and low-intensity recall environment while dropping the rest of the strata.
Matching Covariates. Our matching covariates are both theoretically and statistically
motivated. As discussed above, we seek to identify variables that impact both recall
environment intensity (through an impact on recall timing) and firm value. According to
Eilert et al. (2017) recall timing for passive recalls could be determined by problem
severity along with its interactions with a brand’s reliability reputation, brand
diversification, and past recall intensity. These variables have also been shown to impact
firm value (Eilert et al. 2017; Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009). Accordingly, we consider
problem severity, reliability reputation, brand diversification, past recall intensity, recall
strategy, and two-way and three-way interactions of these variables as potential
determinants of recall timing (and therefore recall environment intensity) and firm value.
We next estimate a logit model with recall environment intensity (High, Low) as
the dependent variable and all the covariates mentioned above as the independent
variables. By estimating a logit model: (a) we are able to reduce the number of matching
covariates by identifying and using factors which are statistically significant in
determining recall environment intensity, and (2) validate our theoretical claims about
covariates.
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1.3.6 Empirical Specification
Since for a given stratum there could be a different number of firms facing high or lowintensity environments, strata sizes are likely to vary. CEM accounts for varying strata
sizes by generating weights, which need to be recognized in the econometric
specification. We use a weighted linear regression of cumulative abnormal returns on
recall environment intensity, its interactions with the recalled product’s age and recalled
brand’s reliability reputation, and control variables (except the covariates we used for
matching). Thus, our econometric specification is:
CAR ij = β0 + β1 ENVi + β2 AGEi + β3 REPUTij + β12 ENVi × AGEi + β13 ENVi ×
REPUTATIONij + β4 CONTROLij + εij

(1.7)

where i stands for the recall and j stands for the firm issuing the recall. The
variable 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗 refers to cumulative abnormal returns of firm 𝑗 due to recall 𝑖, ENVi refers
to the recall environment intensity at the time of recall 𝑖, AGEi refers to the age of
vehicles affected in recall 𝑖, and REPUTATIONij refers to the reliability reputation of firm
𝑗 at the time of recall 𝑖’s announcement. εij is the error term, and CONTROLij is a vector
of control variables including recall size (RECSIZE), negative publicity (PUBLICITY),
brand diversification (DIVERSE), past recall intensity (PASTRECINT), firm size
(FIRMSIZE), firm debt (FIRMDEBT), firm profitability (ROA), and year variable
(YEAR). Since problem severity (PROBSEV) and recall strategy (RECSTRA) are used
in the matching (in their original format, i.e. dummy variable, in contrast to other
continuous variables which were coarsened for the matching), we do not need to further
include them in the model.
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1.4 RESULTS
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.3 presents the summary statistics and correlations between key variables in the
study. In our 90 observations of recall announcements, there are 38 cases of highintensity recall environments (42.22%). On average, vehicles are recalled about 3.74
years after their introduction. While some vehicles were recalled on the same year they
were ready for the market, for some vehicles, it took up to 11 years after introduction to
be recalled by the firm. In addition, the average reliability reputation of recalled brands is
3.35 out of 5 (the average reputation of Toyota, Ford, and Chrysler in the sample is 4.32,
3.10 and 2.27 respectively). Considering negative standardized values of the age as new
products and negative standardized values of the reputation as low reputation, in 37 recall
announcements the recalled product is new and in 48 recall announcements the recalled
brand has a low reputation. In addition, the correlations between the independent
variables are within prescribed limits (variance inflation factors < 4).
1.4.2 Abnormal Returns to Recall Announcements
We calculate the abnormal returns accruing from a recall announcement using an event
study. We focused on four short event windows: the event day (i.e. [0, 0]), the day before
the event day (i.e. [-1, -1]), the day after the event date (i.e. [1, 1]), and finally both the
event day and its following day (i.e. [0, 1]). As shown in Table 1.4, the abnormal returns
on the day before the event day are positive but only marginally significant (CAR [-1, -1]
= .25, 𝑝 < .10.). However, abnormal returns on the event day (CAR [0, 0] = −.35, 𝑝 <
.01.) and cumulative abnormal returns over event day and the day after that (CAR [0, 1] =
-.58, 𝑝 < .01) are negative and highly significant. These results are consistent with prior
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findings on the negative impact of product recalls on stock market performance (e.g.
Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Barber and Darrough 1996). Following Barber and Darrough
(1996) and Gao et al. (2015), we chose CAR [0, 1] as the dependent variable in the crosssectional analysis.
1.4.3 Selection of Variables for Coarsened Exact Matching
Table 1.5 shows the results of estimating a logit model with recall environment intensity
(high vs. low) as the dependent variable and all the prospective matching covariates,
identified earlier, as the independent variables. We find that the model is significant and
among all factors, recall strategy, its two-way interactions with problem severity,
reliability reputation, and brand diversification, the two-way interaction of past recall
intensity with problem severity, and three-way interactions of recall strategy and problem
severity with reliability reputation, brand diversification, and past recall intensity
significantly affect recall environment intensity. Results, as shown in Table 1.5, mirror
the findings of Eilert et al. (2017) about factors that influence the timing of the recall. We
found that recall environment intensity is mainly driven by the recall strategy (passive vs.
proactive). This makes sense because a firm’s motivation of when to announce a recall
would be different under the circumstance of a voluntary, firm-initiated investigation
versus a government-initiated process with legal pressures (Hora, Bapuji, and Roth
2011). Moreover, in government-initiated investigations, lawsuits are more likely in cases
of severe problems and hence, firm managers are inclined to delay the recall so there is a
chance that investigation ends without a recall. The significant effect of recall strategy
and its interaction with problem severity confirms this argument. However, the
motivation to delay the recall because of lawsuits is lower for high reputation brands
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which may see their reputation in danger (Eilert et al. 2017). That is consistent with our
findings that the two-way interaction of reliability reputation with recall strategy, and the
three-way interaction of reliability reputation, recall strategy, and problem severity
significantly affects recall environment intensity. Brand diversification is another variable
that may affect the timing of recalls (and so recall environment intensity). Highly
diversified brands are less capable of investigating the product defect quickly especially
in the case of severe problems. They are also less motivated to respond to governmentinitiated investigations since it may put non-recalled products by the same brand at risk
(Eilert et al. 2017). As shown in Table 1.5, significant coefficients for the two-way
interaction of brand diversification and recall strategy, and the three-way interaction of
brand diversification, recall strategy and problem severity confirms our arguments above.
Finally, we find significant impact for the three-way interaction of past recall intensity,
recall strategy, and problem severity which is consistent with arguments of Eilert et al.
(2017) regarding the learning effect of past recall intensity which may affect the ability of
a firm to issue a quick recall.
In sum, using the results of the logit model, we can find significant determinants
of recall environment intensity which are consistent with prior literature regarding the
determinants of recall timing. For the sake of parsimony, we retained only the significant
variables, for coarsened exact matching. Before matching we have 90 observations with a
multivariate imbalance of 0.25 while after matching, 12 unmatched observations are
discarded and the multivariate imbalance is reduced to zero.
We also checked for the distribution of age and reputation across high and low
recall environment intensity to check for whether we have enough observations to test
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interactions after matching. Table 1.6 shows the similarity of the distribution before and
after matching. After matching the data, there are 43 cases of low and 35 cases of high
environment intensity. In total, 41 cases involved new products and 37 cases involved
high reputation brands. Also, the number of observations in each group of age or
reputation is comparable across low and high recall environment intensity.
1.4.4 Impact of Recall Environment Intensity on Post-Recall Stock Returns
We first estimate the impact of recall environment intensity on abnormal returns. As
shown in the first column of Table 1.7, Model 1 the effect of recall environment intensity
on abnormal returns is negative and significant (−.0068, p <.0.05) which supports H1B.
Thus, an increase in recall environment intensity draws investor attention towards the
focal firm and amplifies the decline in stock price. It shows that in high-intensity
environments, the attention-grabbing effect dominates the attribution adjustment effect.
Next, we move on to test the moderating role of age and brand reputation. As
shown in the second column of Table 1.7, Model 2, the interaction between recall
environment intensity and recalled products’ age is negative and significant (−.0068, p <
0.05), which supports H2. This result indicates that the age of recalled products
strengthens the attention-grabbing effect and weakens the attribution adjustment effect.
Hence, the negative effect of the recall environment intensity on post-recall stock returns
will be stronger for older products. On the other hand, the interaction between recall
environment intensity and reliability reputation is positive and highly significant (.0096,
p < 0.01), which supports H3. This evidence suggests that compared to brands with lower
reputation, brands with higher reputation experience a weaker negative effect of recall
environment intensity on post-recall stock returns.
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Hence, we identified a negative impact of recall environment intensity on postrecall abnormal returns. We also found that this negative effect is strengthened as the age
of recalled products increases and weakened as the reputation of recalled brands
increases.
1.4.5 Robustness Check
We test robustness of our findings with respect to alternative empirical specifications and
identifying assumptions. First, we test if our results are driven by firm-specific
unobserved factors. Using CEM we could account for the observed factors which could
simultaneously determine recall environment and firm value, but not the unobserved
factors. For example, we estimate our empirical specification by including 1) firm fixed
effects, and 2) a random intercept. As shown in the first two columns of Table 1.8,
Models 1 and 2, results of both models confirm the negative effect of recall environment
intensity, the negative moderation effect of product age and the positive moderation
effect of reliability reputation. Next, we ignore matching and estimate our empirical
specification using OLS while considering recall environment intensity and continuous
variable and conditioning our analysis on all the covariates which could determine recall
environment intensity and abnormal returns. As shown in the third column of Table 1.8,
Model 3, we could replicate all our prior results, except that for the interaction of product
age and recall environment intensity. The insignificant moderation effect of product age
could be because of the low ratio of observations to independent variables, which include
endogeneity-related variables. Moreover, we check whether not using CEM-generated
weights affect our results or not. Results of the robust OLS, Model 4 in Table 1.8, show
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that the main effect of recall environment intensity and its interactions do not depend on
using CEM-generated weights.
Next, we test the robustness of our findings using alternative matching algorithms such as
nearest neighbor matching and propensity score matching. Matching methods differ in
terms of the way they identify suitable control units for every treated unit. CEM identifies
treated and control units in cells obtained by coarsening the matching covariates. Cells
which lack either control units or treated units are dropped from the analysis. Nearest
neighbor matching uses distance (e.g., Mahalnobis distance) between treated and control
units as a function of matching covariates to identify control unit/s for every treated unit.
Propensity scores matching identifies matches using propensity of treatment as the
distance metric. In Table 1.9 we show the results of model estimation after matching
firms in high and low environment intensity using Nearest Neighbor Matching with
different calipers and propensity score matching by employing matching covariates
identified earlier. Our results are consistent across different matching algorithms.
1.5 DISCUSSION
Automobile recalls are frequent events, and hence, any recall by an auto manufacturer
inherently happens in recall environment shaped by a series of recalls by competitors.
Yet, how the recall environment alters the impact of a recall on firm value had not
received much attention in extant research. Therefore, we conceptualize recall
environment intensity and develop a theoretical framework of whether and how recall
environment intensity may influence the negative impact of a recall on stock returns. We
also identify brand and product characteristics that pose boundary conditions to the
relationship between recall environment intensity and stock returns. We find that, on
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average, an intense recall environment is harmful to firm performance and may worsen
negative stock market returns accruing from a recall announcement. This negative effect
is the result of a dominant attention-grabbing effect in competing with attribution
adjustment effect. We next show that reliability reputation and the age of recalled
products are major determinants of whether an intense recall environment helps or hurts
firms. Our findings show that high (vs. low) reputation firms or firms issuing recalls for
younger products are less affected by an intense recall environment.
1.5.1 Research Implications
Our study is related to the research stream which is focused at understanding the
antecedents and consequences of the timing to issue a recall (e.g., Eilert et al. 2017).
Besides, our study is among the very few studies (such as Rupp 2004; Gao et al. 2015)
which have explored how the characteristics of recalled products influence abnormal
returns. We contribute to the literature by conceptualizing recall environment and
explaining how it could impact abnormal returns accruing from product recalls.
Furthermore, we develop a method to measure recall environment intensity. In doing so,
we provide guidance on a key factor that researchers need to account for when they
estimate the impact of a recall event on firm value. In addition, we explain how
attribution adjustment and attention-grabbing effects may have opposing effects on the
impact of recall environment intensity on firm value. We further contribute by theorizing
the factors, product age and reliability reputation, which could amplify or dampen the
negative impact of recall environment on abnormal returns. In effect, we show that the
recall environment matters when firms consider the impact of a potential recall and that
the impact is conditional on product and brand characteristics. Overall, we provide new
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insights to help researchers and public policy officials gain insights into how stakeholders
respond to recall announcements.
1.5.2 Managerial Implications
Product recalls are harmful events for firms. The results from the manuscript show
managers that an intense recall environment characterized by salient recalls of rivals do
not allow them to escape unpunished should they announce a recall. On the contrary, the
stock market seems to punish firms more if their recall happens in such an environment.
Thus, at a minimum, we show managers that strategically timing recalls to take
advantage of rivals’ misfortune is not necessarily a strategy that is rewarded by investors.
Postponing recalls to avoid an intense recall environment might not necessarily be a
viable strategy either because of the difficulty in predicting the recall schedule of rival
firms. Furthermore, the literature has shown that delaying recalls is not an effective
strategy (Eilert et al. 2017).
Interaction terms let us identify conditions under which recall environment
intensity can lessen or worsen the harmful impact of product recalls on stock returns. We
use linear combinations of the recall environment intensity coefficient (𝛽1) and
interaction coefficients (𝛽2, 𝛽3) to find the net effect of recall environment intensity in
different conditions, as shown in Table 1.10. By doing so, we find that the high
reputation of brands such as Toyota or Honda can lower the impact of an intense
environment. Thus, managers of high reputation brands can afford to less concerned
about the impact of the recall environment when they undertake a recall. For instance,
when recalled vehicles are between 1 to 8 years old, recall environment intensity has no
significant effect on high reputation brands. However, age does affect the ability of a
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firm’s reputation to mitigate the impact of the recall environment. Even a high reputation
brand such as Honda in 2016 can face stronger negative abnormal returns from a recall
when recalled vehicles are older than 9 years.
On the other hand, low reputation brands mostly are prone to the negative impact
of an intense environment. A low reputation brand such as Chevrolet in 2014 will always
face more negative abnormal returns when it recalls any vehicle in a higher intensity
environment. However, this negative impact of recall environment intensity decreases as
the age of vehicles decreases. For example, a low reputation brand such as Ford in 2012
will be immune from an intense environment when recalled vehicles are introduced less
than 2 years old before the recall announcement.
From the above results, managers should take note of the fact that the net impact
of recall environment intensity depends on the reputation of the recalled brands and the
age of the recalled products. While the intensity of the recall environment mostly
damages the returns for low reputation brands, high reputation brands are less susceptible
to that damage.
1.5.3 Limitation and Future Directions
While the manuscript provides interesting insights into product recalls, the fact that the
study is limited to the automobile industry implies that caution is warranted in
generalizing our findings to other settings. The benefit of using data from a single
industry is that we are able to improve the internal validity of the findings. The
automotive industry is a highly relevant industry from an economic perspective,
representing more than 3% of the gross domestic product in the United States. Also, the
high frequency of recalls in this industry makes recall environment an important factor to
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be considered. Nonetheless, an avenue for further research is to investigate firms’ recall
timing decisions in other industries to help in generating empirical generalizations.

34

Table 1.1 Related Literature and the Incremental Contributions of the Study
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Related
Literature
The impact of
Product Recalls
on Stock
Returns

Main Publications

Key Findings

Our Incremental Contribution

Barber and Darrough (1996)
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009)
Chen and Nguyen (2013)
Chu, Lin, and Prather (2005)
Davidson and Worrell (1992)
Eilert et al. (2017)
Gao etal. (2015)
Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1987)
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985)
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011)
Thomsen and McKenzie (2001)

(1) Product recalls, on average, hurt the
recalling firms’ stock prices by generating
negative abnormal returns.
(2) This damage may vary based on factors
such as the timing of the recall, recall strategy
(passive vs. proactive), the degree of harm,
defective component, type of remedy, and ad
spending before the recall.

Our study proposes a more accurate
measure of post-recall abnormal
returns by accounting for the recall
environment intensity.

Timing of
Recall
Announcements

Eilert et al. (2017)
Hora, Bapuji, and Roth (2011)

(1) Recall strategy, type of defect and supply
chain entity determines the time between the
product introduction and its recall.
(2) The severity of the problem enhances time
to recall when an investigation is opened

Our study identifies another timing
decision, i.e. issuing a recall closer to
or farther from competitors’ recalls.

The Impact of
Product Recalls
on Consumers

Ahluwalia Burnkrant, and Unnava (2000)
Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen (2008)
Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe (2013)
Dawar and Pillutla (2000)
Klein and Dawar (2004)
Lei, Dawar, and Gurhan-canli (2012)
Souiden and Pons (2009)
Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe (2007)

(1) A severe recall hurts a firm’s image as well
as its baseline sales, advertising effectiveness
and customers’ price sensitivity.
(2) A major driver of customers’ negative
reactions to a product recall is whether they
attribute the blame to the firm or external
factors.

We contribute to this literature by
showing that recall environment can
mitigate customers’ negative
attributions of blame after a recall.

Table 1.2 Data Sources and Measure Operationalization
Variable

Definition/Operationalization

Data
Source

ENV

Each of (1) the number of vehicles affected in, (2) the number of U.S. newspaper citations of, (3) the
number of vehicle segments involved in competitor recalls in each day of the estimation period are weighted
summed over days, with time difference between the competitors’ recall and the focal firm’s recall as the
weight. From these three cumulative scores, we generated a single factor using principal component
analysis. The factor is then mean-split to generate a dummy which equals 1 for high environment intensity
and 0 for low environment intensity.
The difference of the recall year and the introduction year averaged across all model-years involved in a
recall campaign
A three-year average of overall problem rates of all models of a make averaged across all models in a year,
and then averaged over five years prior to the selected year
The logarithm of the total number of vehicles affected by the recall
A dummy variable which equals 1 if crashes, fires, injuries or fatalities are reported by the recall
announcement, and equals 0 otherwise
Whether the recall is issued after an investigation is opened (1) or not (0)
Number of citations of a recall in U.S. newspapers over the event window
The principal component score of (1) number of models and (2) variation in engine sizes across models

NHTSA
Factiva

AGE
REPUT
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RECSIZE
PROBSEV
RECSTRA
PUBLICITY
DIVERSE
PASTRECINT
FIRMSIZE
FIRMDEBT
ROA
YEAR

The principal component score of (1) the total number of vehicles recalled, and (2) the total number of
recalls issued by the focal firm in the preceding year
The logarithm of the firm’s sales revenue
The logarithm of the firm’s long-term liability
Return on assets = Net income/Total assets
Years elapsed from 2011 to the recall announcement

NHTSA
Consumer
Reports
NHTSA

NHTSA
Factiva
Web
Resources
NHTSA
Compustat
Compustat
Bloomberg
NHTSA

Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients, (N=90)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14
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1. ENV

+1.00

2. AGE

+0.01

+1.00

3. REPUT

−0.02

+0.28

+1.00

4. RECSIZE

+0.05

+0.24

+0.10

+1.00

5. PROBSEV

−0.15

+0.12

−0.16

+0.29

+1.00

6. RECSTRA

−0.05

+0.32

+0.05

+0.19

+0.26

+1.00

7. PUBLICITY

+0.04

+0.09

−0.11

+0.43

+0.05

+0.21

+1.00

8. DIVERSE

−0.04

−0.16

−0.53

−0.10

+0.03

−0.16

+0.02

+1.00

9. PASTREC

+0.20

+0.12

−0.24

+0.01

+0.08

−0.07

−0.03

+0.07

+1.00

10. FIRMSIZE

+0.16

+0.07

+0.21

+0.24

−0.02

−0.08

+0.11

+0.12

−0.01

+1.00

11. FIRMDEBT

+0.16

+0.11

+0.37

+0.16

−0.18

−0.10

+0.03

+0.14

+0.04

+0.42

+1.00

12. ROA

+0.09

−0.14

+0.13

−0.09

+0.16

+0.08

−0.07

+0.03

−0.33

+0.30

−0.09

+1.00

13. YEAR

+0.23

+0.01

−0.25

−0.08

−0.08

−0.20

−0.14

+0.13

+0.42

+0.04

+0.32

−0.28

+1.00

14. CAR [0,1]

−0.10

−0.13

−0.04

−0.10

+0.14

−0.18

−0.01

−0.05

+0.14

+0.12

+0.18

−0.09

+0.20

+1.00

MEAN

+0.42

+3.74

+3.35

+5.41

+0.34

+0.29

+1.61

+1.72

−0.08

+4.57

+4.62

+0.01

+3.69

−0.01

SD

+0.50

+3.15

+0.83

+0.49

+0.48

+0.46

+2.17

+0.96

+0.97

+0.12

+0.30

+0.01

+1.58

+0.01

MIN

+0.00

+0.00

+2.09

+4.63

+0.00

+0.00

+0.00

−0.15

−1.26

+4.32

+3.99

−0.00

+1.00

−0.05

MAX

+1.00

+11.0

+4.57

+6.50

+1.00

+1.00

+12.0

+3.47

+3.71

+4.87

+4.97

+0.02

+6.00

+0.03

Table 1.4 Abnormal Returns Over Different Event Windows (N=90)
Event Window

Abnormal Return

Std. Error

t-Statistics

p-value

[−1, −1]

+.0025

−.0015

−1.72

<.10

[0, 0]

−.0035

−.0011

−3.14

<.01

[1, 1]

−.0023

−.0010

−2.25

<.05

[0, 1]

−.0058

−.0015

−2.25

<.01
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Table 1.5 Estimation Results of Logit Regression for Selecting Matching Covariates
Variable

Before Matching

After Matching

PROBSEV

−00.7726

(1.2774)

−00.7727

(1.2785)

dREPUT

−00.2813

(0.7714)

−00.2814

(0.7721)

dDIVERSE

−00.7140

(0.7160)

−00.7142

(0.7166)

dPASTREC

−00.9508

(0.7141)

−00.9510

(0.7148)

RECSTRA

−16.6657***

(0.9643)

−01.0401

(3.5011)

RECSTRA×PROBSEV

−16.1808***

(2.2105)

−00.3469

(2.3820)

RECSTRA× dREPUT

−17.1569***

(1.2907)

−01.5313

(3.2625)

RECSTRA× dDIVERSE

−16.7242***

(1.7071)

−01.0986

(2.7255)

RECSTRA× dPASTREC

−00.9507

(1.5914)

−00.9510

(1.5928)

dREPUT ×PROBSEV

−01.3799

(1.7189)

−01.3800

(1.7204)

dDIVERSE ×PROBSEV

−01.8126

(1.6947)

−01.8127

(1.6962)

dPASTREC ×PROBSEV

−17.8104***

(1.1704)

−00.0000

(omitted)

RECSTRA×PROBSEV×

−16.9598***

(2.8574)

−01.1259

(2.9500)

−14.9820***

(2.7280)

−00.0000

(omitted)

−18.4541***

(2.3729)

−00.0000

(omitted)

dREPUT
RECSTRA×PROBSEV×
dDIVERSE
RECSTRA×PROBSEV×
dPASTREC

Num. of Observations

90

78

Wald Chi-squared (12)

+.92***

.92

Pseudo R-squared

+14.60

.06
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Table 1.6 Distribution of Recall Environment Intensity Before/After Matching
Before Matching

After Matching

High

Low

High

Low

Overall

38

52

35

43

New Product

21

27

20

21

Old Product

17

25

15

22

High Reputation Brand

14

20

14

23

Low Reputation Brand

24

32

21

20

40

Table 1.7 Estimation Results of Weighted Least Squares Regression
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

ENV

−.0068**

(.0034)

−.0087***

(.0033)

AGE

−.0006

(.0017)

+.0028

(.0022)

REPUT

−.0057*

(.0031)

−.0102***

(.0034)

ENV × AGE

−.0068**

(.0033)

ENV × REPUT

+.0096***

(.0034)

RECSIZE

−.0070*

(.0038)

−.0058

(.0037)

PUBLICITY

+.0001

(.0010)

−.0003

(.0010)

DIVERSE

−.0052**

(.0027)

−.0056**

(.0025)

PASTREC

+.0003

(.0021)

+.0022

(.0021)

FIRMSIZE

+.0289*

(.0150)

+.0213

(.0145)

FIRMDEBT

+.0135

(.0087)

+.0131

(.0084)

ROA

+.3973

(.4240)

+.4898

(.4044)

RECYEAR

+.0010

(.0013)

+.0007

(.0013)

R-squared
Number of Observations

.2272

.3248

78

78
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Table 1.8 Robustness Analysis: Alternative Model Specifications

42

ENV
AGE
REPUT
ENV × AGE
ENV × REPUT
RECSIZE
PUBLICITY
DIVERSE
PASTREC
FIRMSIZE
FIRMDEBT
ROA
RECYEAR

Firm Dummies

Model 1
WLS w/ Fixed Firm Effects

Model 2
WLS w/ Random Intercept

−.0085**
+.0023
−.0200
−.0067**
+.0093**
−.0072*
−.0001
−.0023
−.0019
+.0353
−.0309*
+.4695
−.0005

−.0059**
+.0004
−.0050*
−.0054*
+.0065**
−.0048
+.0002
−.0035*
−.0027
+.0149
−.0106
−.0798
−.0010

(.0034)
(.0022)
(.0124)
(.0033)
(.0035)
(.0038)
(.0009)
(.0031)
(.0023)
(.0252)
(.0169)
(.4140)
(.0014)

(.0029)
(.0005)
(.0027)
(.0030)
(.0031)
(.0034)
(.0008)
(.0020)
(.0017)
(.0140)
(.0070)
(.3546)
(.0012)

Model 3
OLS w/ Endogeneity-Related
Covariates in the Model
(.0033)
−.0059**
(.0021)
+.0004
(.0034)
−.0055
(.0032)
−.0031
**
(.0034)
+.0070
(.0037)
−.0047
(.0009)
+.0010
(.0025)
−.0020
(.0022)
−.0030*
(.0148)
+.0103
(.0084)
−.0092
(.4117)
−.0172
(.0013)
−.0007

Model 4
OLS (w/o CEMGenerated Weights)
−.0080** (.0033)
(.0021)
+.0017
−.0084** (.0034)
(.0032)
−.0057*
**
(.0034)
+.0082
(.0037)
−.0071*
(.0009)
−.0003
**
(.0025)
−.0052
(.0022)
+.0020
(.0148)
+.0204
(.0084)
−.0122
(.4117)
+.3397
(.0013)
−.0007

No Significant

Endogeneity-Related
Covariates

No Significant

Number of Observations

78

78

R-squared

.3670

.1703

90

78

.3216

.2870

Table 1.9 Robustness Analysis: Alternative Matching Methods
Nearest Neighbor
Matching, Caliper=0.0001

Nearest Neighbor
Matching, Caliper=1

Nearest Neighbor
Matching, Caliper=4.4

Nearest Neighbor
Matching, Caliper=5

Propensity Score
Matching, Caliper=0.01

ENV

−.0080***

(.0028)

−.0080***

(.0028)

−.0076***

(.0029)

−.0064**

(.0033)

−.0073***

(.0027)

AGE

+.0017

(.0020)

+.0017

(.0020)

+.0009

(.0020)

+.0006

(.0021)

+.0016

(.0020)

REPUT
ENV × AGE

−.0084

**

(.0037)

−.0084

**

−.0057

*
*

(.0037)

−.0087

**

−.0052

*
**

−.0057

*

ENV × REPUT

+.0082

**

(.0036)

+.0082

(.0036)

+.0084

RECSIZE

−.0071*

(.0038)

−.0071*

(.0038)

−.0058*

PUBLICITY

−.0003

(.0007)

−.0003

(.0007)

−.0004

DIVERSE

−.0052

**

(.0029)

(.0020)

−.0052

**

(.0029)

(.0020)

−.0058

**

(.0038)

−.0050

(.0036)

−.0054

*

(.0029)

**

(.0035)

−.0054

(.0036)

+.0069

*

(.0034)

+.0075

(.0039)

−.0054

(.0037)

−.0062*

(.0037)

(.0007)

−.0002

(.0009)

−.0001

(.0007)

(.0029)

−.0034

(.0032)

***
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(.0025)

−.0050

(.0022)

−.0019

(.0014)

(.0148)

+.0204

(.0144)

−.0102

(.0084)

−.0118

(.0074)

(.3757)

−.0528

(.4117)

+.2673

(.3664)

(.0013)

−.0010

(.0013)

−.0007

(.0013)

(.0023)

+.0020

(.0015)

+.0020

(.0015)

+.0026

(.0016)

+.0030

FIRMSIZE
FIRMDEBT

+.0204

(.0144)

+.0204

(.0144)

+.0199

(.0143)

+.0153

−.0122

(.0079)

−.0122

(.0079)

−.0124

(.0079)

ROA

+.3397

(.3690)

+.3397

(.3690)

+.2089

RECYEAR

−.0007

(.0013)

−.0007

(.0013)

−.0002

R-squared

−.0080

*

PASTREC

Num. of Observations

(.0034)

**

*

(.0017)

78

78

83

87

81

.2870

.2870

.2581

.2279

.2819

44

Age of Recalled Vehicles
(YEARS)

Table 1.10 Change in CAR after Increasing Recall Environment Intensity from Low to High in Different Conditions

2.61
e.g. Chevy
in 2014

2.93
e.g. Ford
in 2016

Reliability Reputation of Recalled Brand (Out of 5)
3.24
3.28
4.12
4.24
4.30
e.g. Ford
e.g. Ford
e.g. Honda
e.g. Toyota e.g. Toyota
in 2013
in 2012
in 2016
in 2014
in 2015

0

Negative

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

1

Negative

Negative

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

2

Negative

Negative

Negative

Not Sig.

3-8

Negative

Negative

Negative

9

Negative

Negative

10

Negative

11

Negative

4.42
e.g. Toyota
in 2011

4.57
e.g. Honda
in 2011

Not Sig.

Positive

Positive

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Negative

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Negative

Negative

Negative

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A FIRM’S PRERECALL CSR EFFORTS AND POST-RECALL MARKET
PERFORMANCE3
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as firm actions that advance the social
good and limit negative externalities of a firm’s operations beyond its financial and legal
obligations (Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and Eilert 2013; McWilliams and Siegel 2001).
Firms are frequently assessed over their CSR efforts. The impact of a firm’s engagement
in CSR activities on its performance has been widely discussed in the past three decades
(for a review, see Aguinis and Glavas 2012). Specifically, it is found that the possession
of a good CSR record improves consumers’ attitudes toward that company and its
products (Brown and Dacin 1997; Creyer 1997; Ellen, Mohr, and Webb 2000). Cone
Communications (2017) reports that when a company supports a social or environmental
issue, 92% of consumers have a more positive image of the company, 88% of consumers
would be more loyal to the company, and 89% of consumers are likely to switch to the
company, given similar price and quality.
The focus of the CSR literature has been on the relationship between CSR
activities and firm performance. While findings are mixed (Margolis, Elfenbein, and
Walsh, 2007), the relationship is mostly found to be positive. However, it is shown that
CSR may also backfire and hurt firm performance in cases such as when customers

3

Javadinia, Seyyed Amirali and Satish Jayachandran. To be submitted to Journal of
Marketing
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perceive low corporate ability, low congruence between CSR and the company character,
insincere motivations, and unfair product prices (Habel, Schons, Alavi, and Wieseke
2016; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Sen and Bahttacharya 2001; Yoon, Gürhan‐Canli, and
Schwarz 2006). Despite the extensive work in this area, less attention has been made to
the role of a firm’s CSR record in the case of negative events. In the current study, we
investigate how a firm’s CSR efforts may alter the impact of a negative firm event on
subsequent product market performance. In particular, we focus on product recalls, which
have seen keen interest in the marketing literature because of their huge impact on firm
performance (e.g. Eilert, Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and Swartz 2017; Jarrell and
Peltzman 1985; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011).
Prior research has shown that a product recall hurts a firm’s image, baseline sales,
advertising effectiveness, and price elasticity (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren,
Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008; Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013), all of which may
damage the firm’s market performance. Hence, we aim to explore how a firm’s CSR
efforts may moderate the extent of this damage. We design our empirical study to provide
answers to the following questions: (1) Does higher CSR efforts by a firm before a
product recall help it in protecting its market share after a product recall announcement?
(2) How the CSR impact may differ across different CSR domains? (3) Which recall
characteristics may moderate the relationship between pre-recall CSR efforts and postrecall market penalties?
The prevailing view is that a good CSR reputation can protect firms against
negative consequences of adverse firm news such as illegal behaviors (Godfrey, Merrill,
and Hansen 2009), ecologically harmful events (Flammer 2013), product failures (Klein
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and Dawar 2004; Minor 2011; Minor and Morgan 2011), and service failures (Bolton and
Mattila 2015). The advocates of this so-called ‘insurance’ mechanism of CSR argue that
good records of CSR create a form of moral capital for the firm that may temper
stakeholders’ negative judgments and reactions in case of adverse events (Godfrey 2005).
We posit that while a firm’s efforts in the philanthropy domain of CSR may have such an
insurance function, efforts in domains such as sustainability impact recall outcomes
through another mechanism, i.e. changing consumers’ pre-recall expectations about
product performance. On one hand, based on the theory of halo effect (Nisbett and
Wilson 1977), increasing sustainability efforts may lead customers to expect a higher
product quality. On the other hand, based on the theory of zero-sum heuristic (Chernev
2007), customers may interpret higher sustainability efforts of firms as a misallocation of
resources and lower product quality. In either case, the higher or lower discrepancy
between pre-recall quality expectations and actual quality revealed by the recall may alter
customers’ negative reactions to the recall announcement.
Using 265 firm-month observations of automobile recall announcements from
2011 to 2014, we find that while philanthropy efforts reduce market penalties accruing
from a recall, the relationship between sustainability efforts and post-recall market
penalties follows an inverted U-shape pattern: increasing sustainability efforts at first
may worsen market penalties through raising pre-recall expectations about product
quality. But after a certain point, more sustainability effort is perceived at the expense of
lower corporate ability in producing high-quality products and lowers customers’ prerecall expectations about product performance. This would be translated into lower
negative market reactions to the recall announcement. We also find that the positive
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effect of philanthropy efforts and the non-linear effect of sustainability efforts are
attenuated as the reputation of recalled brands and the age of the recalled products
increase, respectively.
We contribute to three major research streams in marketing literature. First, as
mentioned before, how CSR activities impact a firm’s performance in case of a negative
event is less discussed in the literature. Studies in this area mainly found a positive effect
of CSR (e.g. Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009; Bolton and Matilla 2015; Minor and
Morgan 2011). However, in the current study, we posit that the effect of CSR could also
be negative (and so non-linear in general). In addition, only a few studies focus on the
role of CSR in product recalls (Klein and Dawar 2004; Minor 2011; Minor and Morgan
2011). These studies find either a positive insurance effect or no effect of CSR on product
recall outcomes and also, they do not consider different domains of CSR. We contribute
to this literature by showing that the insurance effect is only one function of CSR that
may work only in certain domains.
Second, a few studies have explored the effect of CSR on firm performance
across different domains. For example, Jayachnadran, Kalaignanam, and Eilert (2013)
show that a firm’s product social performance and environmental social performance
have both a positive effect on firm performance, while the former has a stronger effect.
Also, Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) break CSR efforts into institutional, which
targets the local community, and technical, which targets a firm’s primary stakeholders,
and find that institutional CSR, in contrast to technical CSR, may create moral capital for
firms that protects them against negative events. We show that CSR efforts in different
domains may affect firm performance through different mechanisms and in different
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directions. Our findings regarding the product recall outcomes show that while
philanthropy efforts are most beneficial in dampening recall damage through the creation
of the moral capital for the firm, sustainability efforts affect firm performance by altering
customers’ pre-recall expectations of product performance. We find that sustainability
efforts must pass a certain point to give the firm an advantage by lowering the pre-recall
quality expectations of customers. Before that point, sustainability efforts would be
harmful since they increase customers’ expectation of product quality and intensify
discrepancy in quality expectation made by the recall announcement.
Finally, despite the high frequency and severe financial consequences of product
recalls, few papers have explored strategies that can help firms mitigate such financial
damage. As an exception, it is shown that using pre-recall advertising adjustments or
choosing a proactive recall strategy can help firms mitigate the negative effect of the
recall on a firm’s stock market performance (Gao, Xie, Wang and, Wilbur 2015; Chen,
Ganesan, and Liu 2009). But product recalls could also threaten a firm’s product market
performance (Souiden and Pons 2009; Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). While
customer characteristics such as loyalty, and commitment are found to moderate this
damage (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008),
no strict firm strategy is proposed to attenuate the recall’s damage to a firm’s product
market performance. We propose that a careful adjustment in pre-recall CSR efforts in
domains such as philanthropy and sustainability could help the firm reduce the negative
impact of product recalls on market performance. Summary of the literature review and
our contributions are provided in Table 2.1.
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We organize the paper as follows. First, we present our conceptual model and
develop hypotheses. Next, we describe our data and the methodology used to test the
hypotheses. Finally, we present the results, discuss the theoretical and managerial
implications of our findings, and suggest several directions for future research.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1.1 Philanthropy and the Creation of Moral Capital
Philanthropy activities constitute a major part of firms’ corporate social responsibility
(Peloza and Shang 2011). CSRhub, which provides company ratings for the community
development and philanthropy subcategory of CSR, defines this domain as efforts that
“reflect a company’s community citizenship charitable giving, donations of good, and
volunteerism of staff time.” Philanthropy-related CSR in the form of financial
contributions to charities, especially in the form of cause-related marketing (CRM), is a
very common practice and is shown to enhance corporate image, thwart negative
publicity, and improve brand image (Varadarajan 1988) and help firms gain social status
(Yoon, Gürhan‐Canli, and Schwarz 2006). Several studies claim that a firm’s
participation in philanthropy-related activities creates a form of goodwill, warm glow,
social approval, or moral capital for the firm that raises favorable perceptions of the firm
and lead to higher levels of emotional attachment and feelings of obligation by
stakeholders (Andreoni 1989; Green and Peloza 2011; Harbaugh 1998). Furthermore,
several researchers argue that this moral capital created by philanthropy efforts acts as an
‘insurance’ mechanism and temper potential sanctions in case of a negative event
(Gardberg and Fombrun 2006; Godfrey 2005). This argument is based on the attribution
theory which suggests that in a corporate crisis, customers engage in spontaneous
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attributions to find the locus of blame (Wong and Weiner 1981). In the case of a product
recall, the moral capital may lead consumers to perceive the locus of product failure as
external, temporary, and not controllable (Klein and Dawar 2004). As a result, customers
may give the firm the benefit of the doubt (Minor and Moregan 2011), and attribute the
product failure to managerial maladroitness rather than malevolence, and consider it as an
anomaly rather than a pattern (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009). Hence, Consumers
may impose less market penalty to the firm. Firms with no effort in philanthropy domains
may lack this form of buffering goodwill and stand exposed to potentially greater market
penalties accruing from product recalls. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Higher pre-recall philanthropy efforts decrease post-recall market penalties.
We also argue that the positive effect of philanthropy is moderated by the reliability
reputation of the brand that is being recalled. A brand’s reliability reputation is
consumers’ subjective belief about a brand’s quality and reliability (Rhee and Haunschild
2006). On one hand, it is shown that a company’s perceived motivation to engage in CSR
is a key determinant of customers’ responsiveness to these efforts (Barone, Miyazaki, and
Taylor 2000) and corporate philanthropy positively affects consumers’ attitude towards
the firm when the motivation is perceived to be altruistic (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, and
Hill 2006). Consumers may make negative and detrimental attributions regarding a firm's
motives if a low-product-quality firm engages in social responsibility. Hence, CSR
initiatives fail to generate moral capital for low reputation brands, which lack the
pragmatic legitimacy (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Wang
and Qian 2011). On the other hand, a high reputation brand already possesses moral
capital among stakeholders which may help it buffer the negative consequences of a
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product recall (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Hence, additional CSR activities may not
have a high contribution to a high reputation brand due to ceiling effects (Bhattacharya
and Sen 2003). Given the presence of equivocal arguments for the moderating effect of a
brand’s reliability reputation, we propose a non-directional hypothesis:
H2: The effect of pre-recall philanthropy efforts on post-recall market penalties is
(a) stronger or (b) weaker when the firm recalls a higher reputation brand.
2.1.2 Sustainability and Expectations of Product Quality
Another important domain of CSR efforts is providing ‘sustainable products’ which refer
to goods or services that have a positive societal and environmental impact (White,
MacDonnel and Ellard 2012; Luchs, Naylor, Irwin, and Raghunathan 2010). This domain
mainly concerns a firm’s effort towards providing green or sustainable (Sammer and
Wüstenhagen 2006; Newman, Gorlin, and Dhar 2014), organic (Pivato, Misani, and
Tencati 2008; Trudel and Cotte 2009), residue-free (Huang 1993), and fair trade
products, which support a better deal for farmers, workers and local communities
(Obermiller, Burke, Talbott, and Green 2009; De Pelsmacker and Janssens 2007). Hence,
in contrast to philanthropy which is irrelevant to the product, sustainability activities are
product-related. CSRhub ratings related to this domain of CSR are provided in three
subcategories. The first one is product subcategory, which is defined as “a company’s
capacity to reduce environmental costs, create new market opportunities through new
sustainable technologies or processes, and products that enhance the health of
consumers.” The second one is human rights and supply chain subcategory, which is
defined as a company’s commitment to human rights conventions, supporting freedom of
association, excluding child, forced or compulsory labor, and transparency in overseas
52

sourcing. Finally, the third one is energy and climate change subcategory, which is
defined as “a company’s effectiveness in addressing climate change through appropriate
policies and strategies, energy-efficient operations, and the development of renewable
energy and other alternative environmental technologies.”
While philanthropy efforts are mostly directed toward local communities and the public
interest groups, a firm’s effort in producing sustainable products targets primary
stakeholders, specifically consumers, who look for more advantageous exchanges with
the firm (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009). Hence, although sustainability efforts may
create some emotional value for consumers, they mostly prioritize functional values of
these product-related efforts over emotional values (Green and Peloza 2011). We contend
that sustainability efforts change the performance outcomes of a product recall mainly
through changing consumers’ expectations of product quality before the recall.
Prior research has shown that consumers make inferences about the unobservable brand
or product attributes using the information on observable attributes (e.g., Huber and
McCann 1982; Johnson and Levin 1985). Specifically, when a product has a positive
attribute, one of the following mechanisms could happen. One possible mechanism is
based on the theory of the halo effect, which predicts that consumers’ evaluation of a
missing attribute should conform to the overall attribution of the product (Nisbett and
Wilson 1977). Hence, the positivity of one attribute should extend to other attributes of
the product or brand. In the case of a sustainable product, they may view other attributes
of a product more positively. In this situation, consumers’ expectations about the product
quality and reliability may increase. Since consumers are often not aware of a
forthcoming recall, the more discrepancy between pre-recall higher expectations of
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quality and the actual quality problem indicated by the recall announcement can lead to
more disappointment of consumers (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). This, in turn, increases
the likelihood of existing consumers to switch to other brands, which decreases market
penalties accruing from the recall announcement.
There is also another possible mechanism by which CSR efforts may impact pre-recall
quality expectations of a product (that is going to be recalled). Theory of zero-sum
heuristic suggests that consumers have a lay theory that firm resources are zero-sum.
Consumers are aware that manufacturers operate under budgetary, product development,
and manufacturing constraints. Given the behavioral implications of efficient markets
(Chernev and Carpenter 2001), consumers may infer that products that are superior on
one attribute will be relatively inferior on other attributes. Hence, superiority on one
product dimension is perceived to be compensated by inferiority on other dimensions
(Chernev 2007; Chernev and Carpenter 2001). When a firm increases its CSR efforts in
certain domains such as sustainability, customers may perceive CSR spending at the
expense of corporate abilities such as keeping high standards of product quality and
safety (Hamzaoui Essoussi and Linton 2010; Newman, Gorlin, and Dhar 2014). Hence,
an increase in a firm’s CSR efforts may also lower consumers’ expectations about the
product quality, and when the actual quality is revealed at the time of recall
announcement, of which consumers are often not aware, there would be less discrepancy
between prior expectations of quality and the actual quality. So customers will make a
less negative reaction towards the recall and the firm suffers from fewer market penalties.
These contrasting theories suggest that there may be a non-linear relationship between a
firm’s pre-recall sustainability efforts and post-recall market penalties. Accordingly, there
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are two possible scenarios: the first scenario is that sustainability efforts may increase
product quality expectations until an optimal point, after which more efforts are
translated into misallocation of resources which leads a firm to have lower quality
products. This is based on the ‘too-much-of-a-good-thing (TMGT) meta-theory in
management literature which states that beneficial antecedents of firm outcomes reach
inflection points after which their relations with desired outcomes cease to be linear, and
they may lead to undesirable outcomes (Pierce and Aguinis 2011). For example, while
diversification strategies may increase efficiencies provided by internal capital markets,
too much diversification may lead to diminished firm performance (Stulz 1990; Denis,
Denis, and Yost, 2002). This effect suggests an inverted U-shape relationship between
sustainability efforts and quality expectation. Hence, at low levels of sustainability, more
efforts lead to a higher discrepancy between pre-recall quality expectations and actual
quality revealed by the recall which translates into more disappointment of consumers
and more market penalties. However, on high levels of sustainability, more efforts lead to
less discrepancy and lower market penalties. This suggests an inverted U-shape
relationship between pre-recall sustainability efforts and post-recall market penalties.
On the other hand, a possible second scenario is that increasing sustainability of products
at the beginning may come at the expense of product quality until a certain point when
the firm achieves more efficient technologies and processes in increasing product
sustainability. This effect implies a U-shaped relationship between sustainability efforts
and quality expectations. Similar to our previous argument, this would be translated to a
U-shape relationship between pre-recall sustainability efforts and post-recall market
penalties. In sum, we purpose the following opposing hypotheses:
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H3a: The relationship between pre-recall sustainability efforts and post-recall
market penalties follows a) an inverted U-shape or b) a U-shape association.
We also argue that the CSR impact on quality expectations (either positive or negative)
depends on consumers’ uncertainty about product quality. Consumers make inferences
using information about observable product attributes when they actually lack
information about unobservable product attributes. Extant research in the domain of
information processing shows that consumers are more likely to draw inferences, such as
those based on a company’s CSR efforts, when they do not have well-articulated
preferences (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Feldman and Lynch 1988). One major
determinant of this uncertainty is the product degree of newness. Customers have a pretty
good deal of information (through reviews and expert opinions) about products has been
on the market for a while. However, a new product imposes uncertainty for consumers
(Gao et al. 2015). Prior researchers have vastly debated that how consumers judge a new
product using a firm’s marketing actions such as brand extensions (Wernerfelt 1988),
advertising (Kopalle and Lehmann 2006), and pricing (Zeithaml 1988). We expect a
similar effect for CSR adjustments. So the positive or negative relationship between prerecall sustainability efforts and post-recall market penalties may attenuate when the
products involved in the recall are older. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
H4: Recalled product’s age negatively moderates the relationship between prerecall sustainability efforts and post-recall market penalties.
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2.2 METHODOLOGY
2.2.1 Data
We collected data from numerous resources. We choose the U.S. automobile industry as
the context of our empirical study. First, automotive industry the largest manufacturing
sector of U.S. economy (American Automotive Policy Council 2018), and has been used
as the context of several studies that examine the negative impact of product recalls on
firm performance (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016; Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Eilert et al.
2017). Second, vehicle recalls are highly frequent, and several auto manufacturers
announce one or multiple recalls each month (NHTSA 2018; Statista 2017), which
provides a great deal of data for testing our hypotheses. Finally, several CSR domains are
of major importance for auto manufacturers, which seek to improve their brand image in
a highly competitive market. Because of the high impact of cars on the environment,
investments in green technology from fuel efficiency to recycling auto parts is becoming
a trend in the industry. We collected product recall data in the automotive industry from
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) database. Specifically, we
obtained data on the eight largest automakers (Toyota, Honda, Nissan, General Motors,
Ford, Volkswagen, Fiat-Chrysler, BMW, Daimler, and Subaru) from 2011 to 2014. Our
final sample consists of 265 observations of firm-month. We collected CSR data from
CSRhub, a source that has been used in prior research (e.g. Aggarwal 2013). CSRhub
rates firms on 4 major categories-employee, environment, community, and governanceand 12 subcategories in total using data from more than 626 sources. Each element of
data received from a source is mapped into one or more subcategory. In addition to using
numerous resources and providing rating over a long time horizon, CSRhub has a major
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advantage to the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database, which is vastly used
by researchers in the CSR literature. In contrast to KLD which provides yearly ratings,
CSRhub issues monthly ratings which make it ideal to examine changes in monthly
market share due to recalls.
In addition to using NHTSA and CSRhub, we also used Factiva for recalls’ media
citations, Automotive News for monthly market share, Consumer Reports for brands’
reliability reputation, and Compustat for firm performance factors. Table 2.2 lists the
specific measures and data sources.
2.2.2 Measures
Independent Variable: Pre-recall CSR Efforts. As mentioned before, CSRhub provides
firm ratings in 12 subcategories. We used CSR ratings in the ‘Community Development
and Philanthropy’ subcategory (under the community category) as a measure of firms’
efforts in philanthropy domain. We also used the average of CSR ratings in ‘Product’ and
‘Human Rights and Supply Chain’ subcategories (under the community category), and
‘Energy and Climate Change’, ‘Environment and Policy Reporting’, and ‘Resource
Management’ subcategories (under the environment category) as the measure for a firm’s
effort in sustainability domain. The description of each subcategory is shown in
Appendix B.
Moderators. We operationalized recalled product’s age (AGE) as the difference between
the recall year and the model-year, averaged across all model-years involved in a recall
campaign. For example, the age of a 2011 Ford Focus when recalled in 2013 would be 2
years. Following Rhee and Haunschild (2006), we measure a brand’s reliability
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reputation (REPUTATION) using a five-point scale of “trouble indexes” obtained from
Consumer Reports. The mean of the “overall problem rate” scores for each model in its
last three years of ownership is calculated. By averaging the overall problem rate scores
of all vehicle models manufactured by a brand we get an overall score for a brand in the
year of the recall. An average overall score over the five years prior to the selected year is
used since reputation is built up over time. Since we have CSR ratings on the firm level
(e.g. General Motors) and a recall may involve different brands of the same firm (e.g.
Chevrolet, Buick, Cadillac, etc.), we use the average reputation of brands recalled by a
firm as the measure of brand reputation. Moreover, a recall could be due to a failure in a
variety of components.
Control Variables. Many researchers argue that firms’ engagement in CSR activities is
because their financial performance has been good enough to provide them with slack
resources, which help them invest in CSR activities (Kang, Germann, and Grewal 2016;
McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis 1988; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003;
Waddock and Graves 1997). Hence not controlling for a firm’s slack resources may cause
a problem of endogeneity. For this reason, we include financial slacks (FSLACKS),
measured in terms of cash reserves (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and Voss 2008), and financial
performance (FPERFORM), measured in terms of turnovers in a month before CSR
rating’s month.
In addition, we control for recall characteristics that may affect consumers’
response to a product recall. These variables include recall magnitude, problem severity,
brand diversification, recall publicity, competitor recalls, and Takata airbag crisis. Recall
magnitude (RECMAG) is measured using the natural logarithm of the number of vehicles
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affected by the recall (Gao et al. 2015). Problem severity is defined as the seriousness of
the product failure consequences and shows owners’ motivation to have defective
vehicles repaired (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994; Rupp 2004). Problem severity is
measured by the type of the defective component and reports of incidents, i.e. crash, fire,
injury or fatality. One aspect of problem severity is the type of the defective component
(Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994). NHTSA classifies defects that impose a serious risk of
fire, crash or injury as severe. Following prior research, we consider a component failure
as severe if it concerns loss of steering, braking problems, engine shutoff, and serious
stalling, unintended acceleration, suspension problems, loss of control, unexpected or
hazardous inflation of airbag, or fire hazards due to electrical short circuits, overheating,
engine malfunction, and fuel leaks. We consider a component failure as non-severe if it’s
related to other problems such as visibility, disabled airbag, brake light, seats, etc.
(Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994; Rupp and Taylor 2002; Gao et al. 2015). We include
both the number of severe (SEV), and non-severe (NONSEV) component failures which
led to recalls by a firm in a month. Also, another aspect of problem severity is the report
of actual incidents that threatened customer safety (Eilert et al. 2017). We control for
these reports of incidents using a dummy variable (INCIDENT) which equals 1 if
crashes, fires, injuries, and fatalities are reported in the recall announcement, and is 0
otherwise.
Moreover, negative perceptions of an affected product could spill over to nonaffected products by the same brand and intensify the damage to the market share. Hence,
we control for brand diversification (DIVERSE), which is measured using the
combination of the number of models and range of engine capacities (highest capacity
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minus the lowest capacity) manufactured by a brand in a year (Rhee and Haunschild
2006). We find a high correlation (=.65) between these two components, and thus,
combine them into a single factor using principal components analysis. The factor
explains 85.6 % of the combined variance and higher scores on this factor mean greater
brand diversification. Since a firm may recall different brands in a single recall campaign,
we use the average diversification of recalled brands. So we include the number of
passive recalls issued by a firm in a month. Next, we control for the negative publicity of
the recall announcement, which is the extent to which the recall is covered by media
since it majorly determines consumers’ awareness of the recall and the extent of their
negative reactions. (Rhee and Haunschild 2006; Rhee & Valdez 2009). We measure
negative publicity (PUBLICITY) as the count number of the citations of a recall
announcement in major U.S. newspapers and business sources (Borah and Tellis 2016).
In addition, we control for the number of vehicles recalled by competitors (COMPSIZE)
and the number of media citations of competitor recalls (COMPPUB) since it may affect
the market share of the focal firm through spillover effects (Borah and Tellis 2016).
Finally, we include a dummy (TAKATA) which equals 1 if the recall is related to the
Takata airbag crisis since this crisis is industry-wide and may affect the market share of
firms differently.
Dependent Variable and Model Specification. In our hypotheses, we predict that a firm’s
philanthropy and sustainability efforts before a recall announcement affects market
penalties accruing from the recall. Hence, we use the change rate of a brand’s market
share dependent variable. Since our CSR ratings are at the firm level and different brands
of the same firm may be involved in a recall, we take the sum of the market share of
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recalled brands. We use the month as the unit of time since a longer period may include
confounding events that make it difficult to detect the impact of a recall. We model the
change rate of a firm’s market share using the following power function for the market
share of firm 𝑖 following recalls issued in month 𝑡 (Rhee and Haunschild 2006):
α
2
MSi,t+1 = MSi,t
exp(β1 × PHILi,t−1 + β2 × SUSi,t−1 + β3 × SUSi,t−1
+ β4 × REPi,t−1 +

β5 × AGEi,t−1 + β14 × PHILi,t−1 × REPi,t−1 + β25 × SUSi,t−1 × AGEi,t−1 + β35 ×
2
SUSi,t−1
× AGEi,t−1 β6 × RECMAGi,t + β7 × SEVi,t + β8 × NONSEVi,t + β9 ×

INCIDENTi,t + β10 × DIVERSEi,t + β11 × PUBLICITYi,t + β12 × COMPSIZEi,t +
β13 × COMPPUBi,t + β14 × TAKATAi,t + β15 × FSLACKSi,t−2 + β16 ×
FPERFORMi,t−2 + mt + yj ) ε𝑖,𝑡+1

(2.1)

Where MSi,t is the sum of market shares of brands recalled by firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡;
PHILi,t−1 is the CSR rating of firm 𝑖 in the philanthropy domain at month 𝑡 − 1 and
𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is the CSR rating of firm 𝑖 in the sustainability domain at month 𝑡 − 1, we
included both the linear and squared terms of this variable; REPi,t−1 is the average
reputation of firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡 − 1; AGEi,t−1 is the average age of vehicles recalled by
firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡 − 1; RECMAGi,t is the total number of vehicles recalled by firm 𝑖 at
month 𝑡; SEVi,t and NONSEVi,t is the number of severe and non-severe component
failures for firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡, respectively; INCIDENTi,t is a dummy which equals 1 if
there is any report of crash, fire, injury or death because of product failures of firm 𝑖 at
month 𝑡; RECSTRATEGYi,t is the number of passive recalls firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡;
PUBLICITYi,t is the number of citations of product failures of firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡 in major
U.S. newspapers and business sources; FSLACKSi,t−2 is the cash reserves of firm 𝑖 at
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month 𝑡 − 2; FPERFORMi,t−2 is the turnover of firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡 − 2; mt and yj (j=1,2,3,
and 4) are two sets of month-specific and year-specific dummies, respectively, to control
for unobservable seasonal effects; and 𝜀 is the error term. By transforming Equation (1)
to its natural logarithm, we obtain the following linear equation with the error term μ𝑖,𝑡+1 :
2
log(MSi,t+1 ) = α × log(MSi,t ) + β1 × PHILi,t−1 + β2 × SUSi,t−1 + β3 × SUSi,t−1
+

β4 × REPi,t−1 + β5 × AGEi,t−1 + β14 × PHILi,t−1 × REPi,t−1 + β25 × SUSi,t−1 ×
2
AGEi,t−1 + β35 × SUSi,t−1
× AGEi,t−1 + β6 × RECMAGi,t + β7 × SEVi,t +

β8 × NONSEVi,t + β9 × INCIDENTi,t + β10 × DIVERSEi,t + β11 × PUBLICITYi,t +
β12 × COMPSIZEi,t + β13 × COMPPUBi,t + β14 × TAKATAi,t + β15 × FSLACKSi,t−2 +
β16 × FPERFORMi,t−2 + mt + yj + μ𝑖,𝑡+1

(2.2)

A test of H1 requires β1 > 0, a test of H2 requires either β14 < 0 or β14 > 0, a
test of H3a or H3b requires β2 β3 < 0, and a test of H4 requires β2 β25 < 0 and β3 β35 <
0. Following we discuss the results of our analysis.
2.3 RESULTS
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics and correlations between key variables in the
study. The average rating of firms in philanthropy and sustainability domains one month
before the recall month is 51.25 and 61.59 respectively. Moreover, the average reputation
of recalled brands is 3.2 (the average reputation of Ford, Toyota, and Chrysler in the
sample is 3.13, 4.25 and 2.33 respectively), the average age of recalled products is 2.45
years, the average number of vehicles affected in a recall is 331954.4, and the average
media citations of a recall is 2.33. Also, about 13% of recalls accompanied by reports of
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fire, crash, injury or death, and about 4% of recalls were related to Takata airbag crisis.
We also check the correlations between the independent variables and find it within
prescribed limits (variance inflation factors < 5).
2.3.2 Impact of Pre-Recall CSR Efforts on Post-Recall Market Share Change
As shown in Table 2.4, the effect of pre-recall philanthropy efforts on post-recall market
share change is positive and significant (.0366, p <.05) which supports H1, and the
moderation effect of reputation is negative and significant (−.0143, p <.01) which
supports H2b. In addition, we find that the effects of the linear and squared terms of prerecall sustainability efforts are significantly negative (-0.0577, p <.1) and significantly
positive (.0005, p <.1), respectively. This supports H3a and shows that the relationship
between pre-recall sustainability efforts and post-recall market penalties follows an
inverted U-shape. Thus, increasing pre-recall sustainability efforts may increase market
penalties accruing from the recall at first. But after a certain point, increasing efforts lead
to lower market penalties. Finally, we find that age negatively moderates the effect of the
linear term of sustainability (.0265, p <.01) and the squared term of sustainability (-.0002,
p <.01), respectively. This supports H4 and shows that either the positive or the negative
effect of sustainability on market penalties is attenuated as the age of recalled products
increases.
In sum, we could found that philanthropy has a positive relationship and
sustainability has a U-shape relationship with post-recall market share change. Also, both
of these effects are subject to attenuation as the reputation of recalled brands and the age
of recalled products increase.
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2.3.3 Robustness Check
We test the robustness of our findings with respect to alternative model specifications and
alternative measurements of pre-recall CSR efforts. First. we estimate our empirical
specification by including 1) a random intercept, and 2) a firm fixed effects models, as
shown in the first two columns of Table 2.5. Results of both models confirm the positive
effect of philanthropy efforts, the U-shape effect of sustainability efforts, and the negative
moderation of recalled brands’ reputation and recalled products’ age.
Second, we measure pre-recall CSR efforts using the average rating of
philanthropy and sustainability in 3, 6, 12, and 24 months prior to the recall month. As
shown in Table 2.6, results are generally consistent throughout these different measures.
2.4. DISCUSSION
Corporate social responsibility is taking keen interest from scholars and managers since it
is evidenced to have a relationship with firm performance. However, how a firms’ efforts
in CSR may help managers protect future cash flows in the case of negative events such
as product recalls is not well discussed in the literature. In the current paper, we develop a
conceptual framework to test the effect of firm efforts in two specific CSR domains, i.e.
philanthropy and sustainability. While it is mostly believed that CSR effort can create a
form of goodwill that may reduce consumers’ negative reactions to product failure, we
show that this only works in the case of philanthropy efforts. We argue that sustainability
efforts affect recall outcomes through a different mechanism, i.e. changing pre-recall
expectations about product performance. Specifically, we find that increasing
sustainability efforts before a recall announcement may increase expectations and hence,
worsen market penalties accruing from the recall. However, after reaching some point,
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customers perceive more sustainability efforts at the expense of developing corporate
abilities and hence, reduce their expectations of product performance. This leads
customers to less penalize the firm for product failure. In sum, we show that in contrast to
philanthropy efforts which have a positive linear relationship with recall outcomes,
sustainability efforts follow a U-shape relationship. We further show that both effects are
stronger for brands with lower reliability reputation and newly introduced products.
Following, we discuss the implications of our findings for researchers and managers.
2.4.1 Research Implications
Our study is among the very few studies (such as e.g. Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009;
Minor and Morgan 2011; Klein and Dawar 2004) which have investigated the role of a
firm’s CSR records in stakeholders’ reactions to product failures. We contribute to this
literature by distinguishing two important CSR domains, i.e. philanthropy and
sustainability. We find that the prevailing belief that a high CSR reputation insures a firm
against product failures is mostly true about philanthropy-related CSR. Furthermore, we
borrow theories from consumer inference making literature, namely halo effect and zerosum theory, to show that CSR records in a domain such as sustainability may impact
customers’ perceptions of product quality. In addition, since two theories predict a
different relationship between a firm’s CSR record and perceptions of quality, we
contribute to the literature by reconciling these theories and finding a non-linear
relationship between sustainability and perceptions of product performance. Moreover,
we show that this non-linear effect is stronger when there is less information about the
product dimension, which is the case for newly introduced products.
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From another point of view, we also contribute to the product literature. It is
shown that a recall’s damage to firm performance may vary based on factors such as the
timing of the recall, and the degree of harm (Davidson and Worrel 1992; Eilert et al.
2017; Rupp 2004). We add to this research stream by introducing another important
factor, i.e. pre-recall CSR efforts, that may explain the impact of a recall announcement
on firm performance. Especially, since CSR efforts are under the control of firm
managers, our findings propose marketing strategies that may help firms reduce the huge
damage of product recalls, as explained in the following section.
2.4.2 Managerial and Implications
Product recalls are a major threat to a firm’s financial performance. Hence, it is important
to identify firm strategies that may help managers reduce this threat. Especially a firm’s
product recall may impose it to serious market penalties by affecting brand image,
baseline sales, and marketing actions’ effectiveness (Souiden and Pons 2009; Van
Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2008). We show that
one effective way of reducing such market penalties is a firm’s engagement in
philanthropy-related activities such as charitable giving and cause-related marketing.
Such activities may create a moral capital buffer for the firm by which customers
attribute less blame to the firm for product failure. Our findings imply that this strategy
can especially be used by low reputation brands which lack such form of buffering
goodwill. However, high reputation brands which have legitimacy among customers may
take less such an advantage from philanthropy efforts.
Another important strategy that is implied from our findings is the control of the firm’s
sustainability efforts. We show that managers should consider sustainability-related
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activities as a signal of product quality to customers. Increasing such efforts may create a
halo effect and lead customers to think that the more sustainable product is also superior
in other dimensions such as quality and reliability. This rise in expectations lead to more
disappointment after the product failure announcement and hence, should be avoided.
However, customers also have this lay perception that firm resources are limited and so
higher sustainability of products may come at the expense of lower quality. This would
be the case when a firm invests too much in product sustainability. This way lower prerecall expectations and thus, less disappointment of customers by product failure may
benefit the firm. However, there could be other costs associated with the customer’s
lower perception of product quality. Hence, our findings imply that managers that
strategically adjusting pre-recall CSR efforts should be done with caution and
specifically, the reputation of brands and the age of products involved in the recall should
be of consideration.
2.4.3 Limitation and Future Directions
One limitation of our findings is that our analysis is limited to the automobile industry.
Product recalls are also frequent in industries such as food and drug, which also are
moving towards more sustainable products such as organic foods. Sustainability efforts of
these food manufacturing firms may have a different effect on product quality
perceptions, and hence, our findings should be generalized to other settings with caution.
In addition, there are some other domains of CSR activities such as employees and
governance that do not fit into our theoretical framework in this paper. Thus, there is an
avenue for further research to explore how actions in the mentioned domains may affect a
firm’s financial performance.
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Table 2.1 Related Literature and the Incremental Contributions of the Study
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Related Literature

Main Publications

Key Findings

Our Incremental Contribution

The Role of CSR in
Negative Firm
Events

Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009)
Flammer (2013)
Klein and Dawar (2004)
Minor (2011)
Minor and Morgan (2011)
Bolton and Mattila (2015)

A positive CSR record
protects a firm against the
negative consequences of firm
actions such as illegal
behaviors, ecologically
harmful operations, product
failures, and service failures.

We propose that CSR could affect
the negative outcomes of a
product recall by changing
customers’ pre-recall quality
expectation. Through this
mechanism, CSR can either
worsen or improve negative
outcomes.

The Effect CSR
Activities Across
Different Domains

Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and
Eilert (2013)
Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009)

The effect of a firm’s product
social performance (PSP) and
environmental social
performance (ESP) is both
positive but PSP has a
stronger effect.
The moral capital is created
by institutional CSR, rather
than technical CSR.

Our study contributes to this
literature by showing that CSR
efforts in different domains may
affect firm performance through
different mechanisms and in
different directions.

Strategies to Protect
Firm Performance in
a Product Recall

Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009)
Gao, Xie, Wang, and Wilbur (2015)

A passive recall strategy or an
advertising adjustment
before/after a recall
announcement helps firms
reduce the severity of postrecall damage to firm value.

We introduce another marketing
strategy: adjustments in CSR
efforts before the recall
announcement.

Table 2.2 Data Sources and Variable Operationalizations
Variable

Definition/Operationalization

Data Source

PHIL

CSR ratings in the ‘Community Development and Philanthropy’ subcategory (under the community
category)
The average of CSR ratings in ‘Product’ and ‘Human Rights and Supply Chain’ subcategories (under
the community category), and ‘Energy and Climate Change’, ‘Environment and Policy Reporting’, and
‘Resource Management’ subcategories (under the environment category)
Three-year average of overall problem rates of all models of a make averaged across all models in a
year, and then averaged over five years prior to the selected year
The difference of the recall year and the introduction year, averaged across all model-years involved in
a recall campaign
The logarithm of the total number of vehicles affected by the recall
Count number of recalls related to severe issues such as loss of control, hazardous inflation of the
airbag, fuel leaks, etc.
Count number of recalls related to non-severe issues such as visibility, disabled airbag, brake light,
seats, etc.
A dummy variable (INCIDENT) which equals 1 if crashes, fires, injuries, and fatalities are reported in
the recall announcement, and is 0 otherwise
Principal component score of (1) number of models and (2) variation in engine sizes across models
Number of citations of a recall in major newspapers and business sources in the US
Number of vehicles recalled by competitors in the same month
Number of media citations of competitor recalls in the same month
A dummy which equals 1 if the recall is related to the Takata airbag crisis
Cash and short-term investments
Net Turnovers/Sales

CSRhub

SUS

REP
AGE
RECMAG
SEV

70
NONSEV
INCIDENT
DIVERSE
PUBLICITY
COMPSIZE
COMPPUB
TAKATA
FSLACKS),
FPERFORM

CSRhub

Consumer
Reports
NHTSA
NHTSA
NHTSA
NHTSA
NHTSA
Web Resources
Factiva
NHTSA
NHTSA
NHTSA
Compustat
Compustat

Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients, (N=265)
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1
+1.00
+ .98
−.44
−.17
+.15
+.06
+.36
+.20
+.33
+.24
+.50
+.27
−.02
+.03
−.10
+.33
+.20

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1. Log (MS)
2. Log (Lagged MS)
3. PHIL
4. SUS
5. REP
6. AGE
7. RECMAG
8. SEV
9. NONSEV
10. INCIDENT
11. DIVERSE
12. PUBLICITY
13. COMPSIZE
14. COMPPUB
15. TAKATA
16. FSLACKS
17. FPERFORM

+1.00
−.42
−.16
+.16
+.08
+.37
+.19
+.32
+.23
+.49
+.26
−.02
+.02
−.09
+.32
+.20

+1.00
+.30
−.28
−.02
−.16
−.07
−.13
−.10
−.24
−.15
−.03
−.03
−.04
−.21
−.16

+1.00
+.39
+.17
+.02
+.02
−.06
−.06
−.33
+.06
+.25
+.24
+.05
−.17
+.30

+1.00
+.13
+.12
−.19
−.08
−.22
−.14
−.04
+.01
+.04
+.04
−.17
+.06

+1.00
+.45
+.18
+.01
+.11
−.11
+.24
+.15
+.10
+.30
−.01
+.05

+1.00
+.41
+.31
+.34
+.04
+.50
+.07
+.07
+.11
+.10
+.23

+1.00
+.32
+.43
−.02
+.63
+.11
+.13
+.19
+.11
+.29

+1.00
+.30
+.07
+.58
+.01
+.10
+.06
+.12
+.19

+1.00
+.11
+.45
+.01
+.06
−.02
+.17
+.15

+1.00
−.01
−.02
−.03
−.11
+.44
+.04

+1.00
+.06
+.14
+.25
+.10
+.22

+1.00
+.78
+.23
−.06
+.41

+1.00
+.32
−.07
−.39

+1.00
−.13
+.03

+1.00
+.06

+1.00

MEAN
SD
MIN
MAX

−2.2
+.91
−5.81
−.86

−2.71
+.92
−5.81
−.16

+51.2
+3.85
+42.2
+60.6

+61.5
+6.43
+41.2
+72.6

+3.20
+.80
+1.94
+4.57

+2.45
+2.95
0.00
+16.0

+4.55
+1.27
+.60
+6.86

+.74
+.99
0.00
+7.00

+1.47
+1.47
0.00
+13.0

+.13
+.33
0.00
+1.00

+1.06
+.85
−1.09
+4.13

+2.34
+3.64
0.00
+32.0

+.02
+.02
+.01
+1.15

+13.16
+10.94
+1.00
+.52.00

+.04
+.20
0.00
+1.00

+.24
+.11
+.03
+.04

+.35
+.14
+.04
+.07

Table 2.4 Estimation Results of Least Squares Regression
Variable
Log (lagged MS)
PHIL
SUS
SUS2
REP
AGE
PHIL × REP
SUS × AGE
SUS2 × AGE
RECMAG
SEV
NONSEV
INCIDENT
DIVERSE
PUBLICITY
COMPSIZE
COMPPUB
TAKATA
FSLACKS
FPERFORM
MONTH DUMMIES
YEAR DUMMIES

Model
(.0160)
+.9470
**
(.0156)
+.0366
*
(.0313)
−.0577
*
(.0002)
+.0005
***
(.2579)
+.7113
***
(.2718)
−.7717
**
(.0051)
−.0143
***
(.0089)
+.0265
***
(.0001)
−.0002
(.0114)
−.0045
(.0151)
+.0143
(.0093)
+.0094
(.0382)
−.0148
**
(.0174)
+.0422
(.0047)
+.0004
(.0867)
+.0369
(.0019)
−.0022
(.0613)
+.0199
**
(.0124)
−.0093
**
(.1070)
−.0235
One Significant
No Significant
***

ADJUSTED R2
OBSERVATIONS

.9678
265

72

Table 2.5 Robustness Analysis: Alternative Model Specifications
Variable
Log (lagged MS)
PHIL
SUS
SUS2
REP
AGE
PHIL × REP
SUS × AGE
SUS2 × AGE
RECMAG
SEV
NONSEV
INCIDENT
DIVERSE
PUBLICITY
COMPSIZE
COMPPUB
TAKATA
FSLACKS
FPERFORM

Random Intercept Model
(.0149)
+.9470***
**
(.0145)
+.0366
**
(.0292)
−.0577
**
(.0002)
+.0005
***
(.2402)
+.7113
***
(.2532)
−.7717
***
(.0048)
−.0143
***
(.0083)
+.0265
***
(.0001)
−.0002
(.0106)
−.0045
(.0141)
+.0143
(.0087)
+.0094
(.0355)
−.0148
***
(.0162)
+.0422
(.0044)
+.0004
(.0807)
+.0369
(.0018)
−.0022
(.0571)
+.0199
(.0116)
−.0093
(.0996)
−.0235

73

Fixed Effects Model
(.0205)
+.9223***
**
(.0229)
+.0456
**
(.0342)
−.0757
**
(.0003)
+.0006
**
(.3665)
+.8942
***
(.2747)
−.7721
**
(.0072)
−.0176
***
(.0090)
+.0263
***
(.0001)
−.0002
(.0118)
−.0035
(.0153)
+.0117
(.0093)
+.0105
(.0388)
−.0224
(.0197)
+.0310
(.0048)
+.0014
(.0878)
+.0421
(.0020)
−.0025
(.0637)
+.0187
(.0423)
−.3030
(.1090)
−.0056

Table 2.6 Robustness Analysis: Alternative Measures of CSR Efforts
Variable

74

Log (lagged MS)
PHIL
SUS
SUS2
REP
AGE
PHIL × REP
SUS × AGE
SUS2 × AGE
RECMAG
SEV
NONSEV
INCIDENT
DIVERSE
PUBLICITY
COMPSIZE
COMPPUB
TAKATA
FSLACKS
FPERFORM
OBSERVATIONS
ADHUSTED R2

Average CSR Rating in 3
Month Prior to Recall
Month
***
(.0158)
+.9484
(.0162)
+.0257
**
(.0824)
−.1711
(.0008)
+.0018**
**
(.2695)
+.5533
***
(.5943)
−1.8468
**
(.0053)
−.0111
***
(.0240)
+.0772
***
(.0002)
−.0008
(.0114)
−.0045
(.0150)
+.0148
(.0093)
+.0042
(.0376)
−.0171
**
(.0174)
+.0387
(.0047)
+.0009
(.0862)
+.0433
(.0019)
−.0023
(.0614)
+.0576
(.1260)
−.0691
(.1080)
−.0026

Average CSR Rating in 6
Month Prior to Recall
Month
***
(.0157)
+.9548
(.0172)
+.0123
**
(.0839)
−.2110
(.0008)
+.0022***
(.2806)
+.2939
***
(.5903)
−2.3550
(.0055)
−.0058
***
(.0238)
+.0984
***
(.0002)
−.0010
(.0112)
−.0009
(.0149)
+.0145
(.0091)
+.0011
(.0370)
−.0212
*
(.0169)
+.0282
(.0047)
+.0006
(.0857)
+.0410
(.0019)
−.0019
(.0604)
+.0608
(.1230)
−.0089
(.1060)
−.0014

265
.9680

265
.9688

Average CSR in 12
Month Prior to Recall
Month
***
(.0161)
+.9510
(.0188)
−.0134
(.0817)
−.0980
(.0008)
+.0010
(.3008)
−.1716
***
(.5652)
−1.7607
(.0059)
+.0035
***
(.0226)
+.0734
***
(.0002)
−.0008
(.0114)
+.0002
(.0151)
+.0134
(.0092)
+.0035
(.0378)
−.0196
(.0169)
+.0196
(.0048)
−.0011
(.0879)
−.0076
(.0019)
−.0013
(.0613)
+.0202
(.1210)
+.0818
(.1060)
+.0251
265
.9678

Average CSR in 24
Month Prior to Recall
Month
***
(.0159)
+.9508
(.0185)
−.0162
(.0881)
−.0628
(.0009)
+.0006
(.3012)
−.2142
***
(.6394)
−2.6592
(.0058)
+.0045
***
(.0255)
+.1092
***
(.0002)
−.0011
(.0111)
−.0009
(.0147)
+.0100
(.0090)
+.0043
(.0370)
−.032
(.0167)
+.0118
(.0047)
+.0017
(.0860)
−.0012
(.0019)
−.0013
(.06105)
−.0193
(.1120)
+.0667
(.1030)
+.0415
265
.9691
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APPENDIX A
EURO MARKET SEGMENTS OF VEHICLES
Segment
A-segment: Mini Cars

B-segment: Small Cars

C-segment: Medium Cars

D-segment: Large Cars

E-segment: Executive Cars

F-segment: Luxury Cars

S-segment: Sports Cars

M-segment: Multi-Purpose Cars

J-segment: Sport Utility Cars

Pick-ups

Special Purpose Vehicles

Examples of Vehicles in the Segment
Ford Contour-Chevy Spark-Fiat 500-Smart Fortwo
Coupe-Scion IQ- BMW i3- Hyundai i20- Nissan
Micra- Renault Clio
Mini Cooper-Mazda2-Chevy Aveo-Honda Fit-Ford
Fiesta- Mitsubishi Mirage-Toyota Prius-Nissan VersaKia Rio
Toyota Corolla-Honda Civic-Dodge Dart-Buick
Apollo-Ford Focus- Mazda3-Volkswagen JettaMitsubishi Lancer
BMW 3 Series-Audi A4-Lexus IS- Cadillac ATSAcura TL- Hyundai Sonata-Buick Century-Infiniti
Q50- Subaru Legacy
Kia Cadenza- Toyota Avalon-Mercedes CLS-Cadillac
CTS- Audi A7- Chevy Caprice-BMW Series 5- Volvo
S70-Acura RL
Hyundai Equus-Buick Lacrosse-Lexus LS-Porsche
Panamera- Cadillac Fleetwood-Mercedes S ClassMercury Grand Marquis
BMW 6 series- Porsche 911-Chevy Corvette-Mercury
Cougar- Mazda Miata-Audi TT-Ford Mustang-Mazda
MX-6-Lexus SC
Ford C-Max-Hyundai Entourage-Nissan NVVolkswagen Routa-GMC Safari-Kia Sedona-Toyota
Sienna-Chevy Uplander
Toyota 4Runner- Jeep Cherokee-Honda CR-V-Buick
Encore-Ford Edge- Mercedes GL Class- Mitsubishi
Endeavor- Subaru Forester- Infiniti FX
Ram 1500- Chevy Avalanche- Ford F-Series-Nissan
Frontier- GMC Sierra- Toyota Titan-Honda RidgelineMitsubishi Raider-Isuzu TF
Ford Aeromax-Cadillac Limousine-GMC T-SeriesVolvo VNL-Isuzu NPR
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CSR CATEGORIES
Category

Subcategory

Description Summary

Community

Community
Development &
Philanthropy

This subcategory reflects a company’s community citizenship through
charitable giving, donations of goods, and volunteerism of staff time. It also
includes protecting public health (e.g., avoidance of industrial accidents) and
managing the social impacts of its operations on local communities. The
subcategory also includes a company’s land use and building design impact on
the local economy and ecosystem.
This subcategory covers the responsibility of a company for the development,
design, and management of its products and services and their impacts on
customers and society at large. This subcategory reflects a company’s capacity
to reduce environmental costs, create new market opportunities through new
sustainable technologies or processes, and produce or market goods and
services that enhance the health and quality of life for consumers.
This subcategory measures a company’s commitment to respecting
fundamental human rights conventions, its ability to maintain its license to
operate by supporting freedom of association and excluding child, forced or
compulsory labor.
This subcategory covers a company’s capacity to increase its workforce
loyalty and productivity through rewarding, fair, and equal compensation and
financial benefits.
This subcategory covers a company’s labor-management relations and
participation by employees, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
violations or patterns of anti-union practice, conformance to internationally
recognized worker rights, as defined in the basic conventions of the
International Labor Organization (ILO).
This subcategory includes accident and safety performance, as well as job
training, safety standards and training, and employee-management safety
teams. It includes programs to support the health, well-being, and productivity
of all employees.
This subcategory measures a company’s effectiveness in addressing climate
change through appropriate policies and strategies, energy-efficient
operations, and the development of renewable energy and other alternative
environmental technologies.
This subcategory reflects the company’s environmental reporting
performance, adherence to environmental reporting standards such as the
Global Reporting Initiative, and compliance with investors, regulatory and
stakeholders’ requests for transparency.
This subcategory covers how efficiently resources are used in manufacturing
and delivering products and services, including those of a company’s
suppliers. It includes a company’s capacity to reduce the use of materials,
energy or water, and to find more efficient solutions by improving its supply
chain management.

Product

Human Rights &
Supply Chain
Employees

Compensation &
Benefits

Diversity &
Labor Rights

Training, Health
& Safety
Environment

Energy &
Climate Change

Environment
Policy &
Reporting
Resource
Management
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Governance

Board

Leadership
Ethics

Transparency &
Reporting

This subcategory covers a company’s effectiveness in following best practices
in corporate governance principles related to board membership, independent
decision making through experienced, diverse and independent board
members, effectiveness toward following best practices related to board
activities and functions, and board committee structure and composition.
This subcategory measures how a company manages its relationships with its
various stakeholders, including investors, customers, communities, and
regulators. This subcategory measures a company’s effectiveness in treating
its shareholders equitably. Leadership ethics includes the company’s culture of
ethical decision making.
This subcategory rates factors including are corporate policies and practices
aligned with sustainability goals, is the management of the corporation
transparent to stakeholders, are employees appropriately engaged in the
management of the company, and do sustainability reports comply with
standards such as the Global Reporting Initiative, AccountAbility (AA1000)
and other standards, and are these reports made publicly available.
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